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NON-DEBT AND NON-BANK
FINANCING FOR HOME PURCHASE:
PROMISES AND RISKS
SHELBY GREEN*
“[H]ousing is the dominant source of wealth for most families, just as
its twin — mortgage debt — is the chief liability.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 housing and financial industry crisis brought the world to the
brink of economic collapse. While, in some of my earlier articles,2 I told the
story of this woeful time, here, by way of introduction, I will recount briefly
some of the lapses in individual judgment and regulatory oversight by the
main protagonists in the story, only as a backdrop to show how the conditions
were ripe for the advent of novel forms of home purchase finance, the main
focus of this article. I refer to these new forms as non-debt and non-bank
financial companies, or NDNBs.3 Novel financial instruments are not new.
Indeed, the adjustable-rate mortgages (“ARM”) and interest-only
mortgages,4 that factored so prominently in the events leading to the crisis,
2. See Shelby D. Green, Testing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Post-Crisis SelfPreservation Policies under the Fair Housing Act, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 477, 479 (2018)
[hereinafter Green, Testing]; Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Homefront: Disturbing
Crises in the Nation’s Markets and Institutions, 30 PACE L. REV. 7 (2009) [hereinafter
Green, Disquiet].
3. Infra text accompanying notes 36–37 for a further description.
4. These concepts are defined more particularly infra text accompanying notes 88–
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were novel at the time. Superficially, they were beneficial as they made
home ownership manageable because the initial loan repayment amounts
were low and within the borrower’s means. What was troublesome and
perhaps sinister was that they were foisted upon those who could not see that
they would not stay manageable and the debt would increase by those who
knew them well.5 All the while, the regulators were not watching the
changes in the market, per se, but only the sharp trajectory in the volume of
transactions, housing prices and rates of homeownership.6 In the aftermath
of the crisis, many were skeptical of the public apology by the story’s
protagonists, that is, that their activities were based on an honest taken up
desire to support the cause of advancing homeownership for all — a longstanding national policy. Nothing in the national policy called for the
wholesale abandonment of underwriting principles, which were designed to
protect both lenders and consumers of mortgage credit. Lenders chose to
ignore the concern of the creditworthiness of mortgage applicants, instead
blindly taking the applicant at her word, as to her income, assets, and credit
history7 and made one hundred percent loans on contrived appraisals of
value. The low or no-documentation loans, some with a one hundred percent
loan-to-value ratio, at one point accounted for more than two-thirds of certain
loans made by two of the largest banks — Countywide Financial and
Washington Mutual — that collapsed under the weight of their improvidence
in the crisis.8 That default was more likely by a borrower whose dreams of
homeownership were larger than his financial ability, was not unforeseeable.
The homeownership goals thrown up by the improvident lenders began
around the Great Depression when the Roosevelt administration declared the
national goal of the greatest level of home ownership.9 That goal would be
90.
42.

5. I discuss the cohort of those holding ARMs infra text accompanying notes 236–

6. See Robert J. Samuelson, Rethinking the Great Recession, WILSON Q., Winter
2011, at 16, 19.
7. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 160 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC FINAL REPORT], https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; see also id. at 3, 12. We can see this as
lenders recognized the increased risk of loss by precarious borrowers and accounted for
it through higher interest rates and adjustable rate mortgages. Even more sinister was
that lenders knew that when defaults happened, those losses would fall on those who
purchased the mortgages on the secondary market. For a description of the secondary
market, see infra note 16.
8. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at xxiii, 107–09. See generally Green,
Disquiet, supra, note 1 at 9 n.9, 10 n.14 (describing how risky loans and government
encouragement of mortgage loans contributed to the crisis).
9. See FDR and Housing Legislation, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL
LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.fdrlibrary.org/housing (last visited Nov. 19, 2021). I
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achieved by a host of federal policies and programs.10 The first came in the
form of mortgage insurance offered by the Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”) — under which the federal government insured the repayments of
mortgage loans made to borrowers of modest means.11 The significant
advantage to the borrower was that the maturity of loans was extended from
the traditional five years with a balloon payment at the end, to a twenty-fiveyear, fully amortized loan.12
And, with a low down-payment,13
homeownership came within the reach of many. Other federal policies since
adopted to make home purchase affordable, are found in the tax laws — for
example, the deductibility of mortgage interest14 and the exclusion of gain of
up to $500,000 for a couple filling jointly, in the sale of a personal
residence.15
At first, the loan originators’ ability to make loans was limited by the rate
of savings deposits they had on hand. But the creation of the secondary
mortgage market16 changed these dynamics. In 1949, Congress established
the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and in 1970, the
Federal National Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”). Both are
federally-chartered, but privately-owned entities (“Government Sponsored
Entities” or “GSEs”) whose mission was to buy up mortgage loans from loan
originators, thereby creating liquidity for more loans to would-be

discuss the rates of home ownership infra text accompanying notes 39–45.
10. See generally Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Housing Policy: For
the Cities’ Sake, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69 (1998) (examining federal policies and
development of homeownership).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b). The idea was that by providing mortgage insurance, lenders
would increase their levels of lending. In addition, the federal insurance program
imposed interest rate ceilings, established uniform lending criteria, required lower downpayments, and introduced longer mortgage terms. The analogous program created for
Veterans, under the then Veterans’ Administration, not the Department of Veteran’s
Affairs, (“VA”), guaranteed loans on behalf of Veterans.
12. Id.
13. The required down-payment for an FHA loan is now 3.5% as opposed to nonFHA loans which typically require 20%. VA loans can be 100% loans. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1709(b)(9)(A) (requiring a down-payment of not less than 3.5%).
14. See I.R.C. § 163(h). Until the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, interest paid on
mortgage loans of $1 million was deductible, but after, the maximum loan was reduced
to $750,000.
15. Id. § 121.
16. In contrast to the primary mortgage market, consisting of loan originators, the
secondary mortgage market is made up of participants who buy mortgages from loan
originators and sell investments in those mortgages to private and public investors. See
Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage and Mortgage
Finance Market, 90 FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan–Feb 2008, at 31, 34–36,
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/08/01/McDonald.pdf.
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homeowners. 17 Soon, private actors entered the secondary mortgage
market.18 While these were all truly laudable programs, something went
wrong as perverse incentives took hold. Loan originators profited from
packaging loans and because the risks of default traveled with the mortgage
now owned by FNMA or FHLMC, or the private purchaser, the originators
made loans to almost anyone — if he could sign the mortgage papers.19
A host of factors can be discerned as the major culprits in practices leading
up to the crisis. First, the seeming wholesale abandonment of safe
underwriting practices in favor of short-term profits by loan originators.
Second, there was the indiscriminate purchase by the GSEs and private
actors of poor-quality loans, many based on inflated appraisals of the
property. Third, there was the inevitable default by a borrower, whose ARM
interest rate had increased by several percentage points, but whose financial
circumstances had not. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
authorized by the U.S. Senate in May 2009, was the result of one of two
things — either the borrowers never could fulfill their obligations under the
loan or never intended to.20 The effects on the markets were yet the same
either way.
It was a toxic mix of excess and cupidity, whose impact fell heavily not
just on the actors (the financiers and borrowers), but on the nation and the
world. There were millions of foreclosures with no end in sight.21
Homeownership rates took a nose-dive,22 businesses shuttered and factories

17. See id. Later, the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”),
12 U.S.C. § 1716-23(h), was created to purchase loans made to veterans. Ginnie Mae
“guarantees” principal and interest. These GSEs issued debt securities to raise funds for
their purchases.
18. Decades later, private investment companies achieved a large presence in the
secondary market. See OFF. OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, A PRIMER ON THE
SECONDARY MARKET, MORTGAGE MARKET NOTE NO. 08-3 2–3, 7–8 (2008),
https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Research/PaperDocuments/20080721_
MMNote_08-3_N508.pdf. At the time that the famed Lehman Brothers collapsed in
September 2008, it was the largest private holder of mortgage-backed securities with
$619 billion in debts. See Lehman Brother-Fall From Grace, CFI, https://corporate
financeinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/lehman-brothers (last visited Nov.
19, 2021).
19. While the purchase agreements often provided recourse against the originator in
case of defective loans, those cases are still shaking out in the courts. See, e.g., In re Part
60 Put-Back Litig., 165 N.E.3d 180 (N.Y. 2020) (enforcing the sole remedy clause in
securitization contract).
20. Id.
21. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS & RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY 2008–
2013 xii (2018) [hereinafter CRISIS & RESPONSE] (reporting 2.8 million mortgage loans
in foreclosure in the first quarter of 2008, more than four times the number in 2005).
22. See infra text accompanying note 39.
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closed,23 retail sales plummeted,24 and hundreds of commercial banks
failed.25
Alas, it was only after the horses got out that the regulators acted to close
the barn door. The immediate rescue reaction came from the federal
government under the Troubled Asset Relief Fund — a nearly $3 trillion
cash infusion to failing investment banks.26 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were also put under conservatorship under the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”),27 their role as the primary protagonist in
the secondary mortgage markets, curtailed. And lenders had little sympathy
for the beleaguered borrower as filings for foreclosures were almost
automatic. Indeed, a practice of “robo-signing” of default papers arose,
where the same individual from the loan servicer would attest to hundreds of
defaults within the context of a single day, in many cases, without any
verification of the status of the loan, leaving the borrower to sort things out
later in court.28 When this practice became known, several of the larger
banks — Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo — entered into consent
decrees with the United States Department of Justice, which among other
things, required them to verify defaults and have staff available to speak to
beleaguered borrowers.29 On the state level, as courts became overwhelmed
by foreclosure complaints, some adopted moratoria on foreclosures and
mandatory meditation programs.30
When the waters began to calm, Congress and state governments set out
to learn what happened and to examine the conditions that created the
nightmare. Among the prominent findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry
23. See CRISIS & RESPONSE, supra note 21, at xii–xiii (stating that 8.8 million jobs
were lost, having a $10 to $14 trillion economic effect).
24. Robert J. Samuelson, Revisiting the Great Depression, WILSON Q., Winter 2012,
at 36, 38, 41.
25. See CRISIS & RESPONSE, supra note 21, at xiii, xix–xxiii (reporting that the FDIC
closed 500 banks, 12% of all insured banks, at a cost of $73 billion).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 63 and 84.
27. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat.
2654 (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38 and 42 U.S.C.).
28. Anna Louie Sussman, Ex-mortgage Document Exec Pleads Guilty in ‘Robosigning’ Case, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2012, 7:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
robosigning-plea/ex-mortgage-document-exec-pleads-guilty-in-robo-signing-case-idUS
L1E8ML0C120121121.
29. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement
Filed in Federal Court (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/25-billionmortgage-servicing-agreement-filed-federal-court.
30. See, e.g., Foreclosure Mediation Programs by State, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR.,
https://www.nclc.org/issues/foreclosure-mediation-programs-by-state.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2021) (directing the reader’s attention specifically to the Nevada foreclosure
mediation rules).
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Commission, was that there was an utter lack of ethical principles guiding
either face-to-face transactions or corporate decision making.31 As such, the
first regulatory response was to reign in some of the more pernicious deeds
through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 201032 (“Dodd-Frank”). This comprehensive legislation purported to deal
with systemic risk. There were also amendments to the Truth in Lending
Act of 196833 for greater disclosures about the costs of borrowing and new
standards for mortgage loan origination. Moreover, many states followed
with legislation that aimed to protect borrowers from lending abuses.34
Regrettably, Dodd-Frank only offered prospective relief and did not operate
to undo the millions of foreclosures that had already occurred or were in the
pipeline.35 Some foreclosed homeowners were relegated to entering into
installment land contracts to buy back their homes.36 While I discuss below,
in more detail, the need for and promises of the regulatory constraints
imposed by Dodd-Frank upon lenders, for the moment, as the lead into the
main point of this Article, I will note that perversely, rather than making fair
loans more readily available, the legislative and regulatory responses made
it more difficult for the average borrower to obtain a mortgage loan. As new
stringent underwriting standards became mandatory and as lenders were
required to retain some of the risks, many withdrew from mortgage lending
altogether. Enter the non-banks and non-debt financial companies
(“NDNBs”), these entities, while not entirely new on the homebuying scene,
are gaining ground. They cover the entire homebuying experience — from
selling an existing home to providing down payment assistance to long-term
financing. The great benefit of some of these models is that they offer a way
past the seemingly insurmountable barrier — the twenty percent down
payment — that often puts homeownership out of reach for many. The

72.

31. For a discussion of the FCIC’s findings, see infra text accompanying notes 68–

32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
34. E.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 590 (McKinney 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 645B
(2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255F (2021).
35. Many states, though, enacted foreclosure relief measures, and there were more
than a few suits filed against lenders under the original version of TILA and other
consumer protection laws. See Tami Luhby, Predatory-Lending Lawsuits on the Rise,
CNN MONEY (Oct. 9, 2009, 7:19 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2009/10/08/news
/economy/Predatory_lending_lawsuits_increase/index.htm; see also U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY
LENDING (2004), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04280/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-280.htm.
36. See Green, Testing, supra note 2, at 526.

444

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:3

national median home price in 2020 is nearly $350,00037 and a twenty
percent down payment, $70,000, would take a lifetime to save for a
household having the median national income of $62,000. For some,
NDNBs are the only path toward realizing the American dream. For many
— the sophisticated millennials, at ease with technology in everyday affairs,
NDNBs are perfectly fine. But for the cohort that figured so prominently
among the losers in the housing crisis — the less well-educated, less
sophisticated, the more risk averse — the rise in NDNBs is concerning.
Because some of the NDNBs do not implicate traditional mortgages, they
are not subject to the lending regulations aimed to help homebuyers make
informed choices and to protect against abuses, although they could run afoul
of regulations against fraudulent and deceptive practices. But this is a very
broad standard. Even as all the contours of the programs are laid bare, they
may yet pose undue risks to vulnerable consumers that are not mitigated by
any regulation — they portend novel forms of ownership rights that threaten
to disturb the existing taxonomy of property interests that may not be
justified by any discernable societal interests in efficiency and low
information costs.
Whether these inventions and new forms of
homeownership assistance serve to facilitate a promise of security and
autonomy or a nightmare in another guise remains to be seen.
This Article explores the phenomenon of the NDNBs in home purchase
and finance that has gained a growing presence in the mortgage marketplace
since the 2008 crisis. Part II offers a deeper discussion of the risk-prone
practices leading to the 2008 housing crisis and the regulatory and industry
responses for recovery. Parts III and IV describe the emerging new models
of home purchase. Part IV explores some of the apparent and hidden risks
in these transactions. Part VI concludes with suggestions for assessing and
managing risks and for reforms.
II. RISK-PRONE HOME PURCHASE AND LENDING PRACTICES
LEADING TO 2008 HOUSING CRISIS
In this Part, I will highlight some of the more striking aspects of the 2008
housing crisis, about which so much has been written.38 There seems little
37. Median Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United States, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPUS (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
38. E.g., Financial Crises and Recovery: Financial Crises Timeline, PACE UNIV.,
https://libraryguides.law.pace.edu/financialcrisis (last visited Nov. 19, 2021); U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE
FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2010), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/Foreclosure
_09.pdf; Patricia A. McCoy, The Housing Mortgage Financial Crisis: Lessons Learned
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., Working Paper No. HBTL-01, 2013), https://www.jchs.
harvard.edu/sites/default/files/hbtl-01_0.pdf; William R. Emmons et al., The
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disagreement among the commentators on its consequences — that it left the
nation shaken to its economic core, fearful, and distrustful of the traditional
markets and market makers. Despite rising nearly twenty-five percentage
points from thirty four percent in 1934 to just under seventy percent in 2003,
during the crisis, the rate of homeownership plummeted to 67.5% in just five
years.39 Reports revealed a slow climb back up to 67.9% in the second
quarter of 2020.40 The effects of the crisis were felt more sharply by certain
populations within our society.
For African-Americans, whose
homeownership rates have always lagged behind whites, in the fourth quarter
of 2008, it stood at only 46.8% only to rise to 47% in 2020.41 There are
similar disparities for Latino households (historically at 48.5%, but rising to
51.4% in 2020).42 For Asian-Americans and Native Hawaiian and Pacific
Islanders, the homeownership rate was (61.4% in 2020).43 These numbers
Foreclosure Crisis 2008: Predatory Lending or Household Overreaching?, REG’L
ECONOMIST, July 2011, at 12, 12, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6575498.pdf; Julie L.
Stackhouse, Lessons Learned from the Financial Crises, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS
(Sept. 11, 2011), https://www.stlouisfed.org/dialogue-with-the-fed/lessons-learnedfrom-the-financial-crisis.
39. See Dean Baker, Subprime Borrowers Deserve an Own to Rent Transition, 5
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 2 (2008), http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss1/art5; see also
OFF. OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, REPORT TO CONGRESS (2008), https://
www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/OFHEO_Report_Congress-2008.
pdf.
40. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY/HOUSING VACANCY
SURVEY, 6 tbl. 14 (2021) [hereinafter CENSUS POPULATION SURVEY], https://www.
census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html.
41. The St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Research Series is the source for
comprehensive rates of ownership by demographics and over time. Homeownership
Rates by Race and Ethnicity: Black Alone in the United States, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOAAAHORUSQ156N (last visited Jan. 18,
2022). A post-crisis analysis confirmed what many suspected while it was happening.
Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, and the Emergency
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 200 and H.R. 225 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009). That is, the rate of foreclosure for
African-American and Latinx homeowners over age 50 was nearly double that for white
homeowners in all age groups and roughly double the rate of minority homeownership.
See id. at 71–72 (statement of David M. Certner, Legal Counsel and Legislative Policy
Director, AARP, Washington, D.C.). The precise numbers are stark: Older AfricanAmerican homeowners held only 6.8% of all first mortgages, but suffered 14.4% of all
foreclosures; for Latinx homeowners, those numbers were 7.5% and 15.9% respectively.
Id. For homeowners over the age of 50, there was nearly a 17 times greater likelihood
that there loans were subprime. Id.
42. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity: Hispanic (of Any Race) in the
United States, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/HOLHORUSQ156N (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
43. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity: All Other Races: Asian, Native
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/series/ANHPIHORUSQ156N (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
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stand in contrast to the rates for whites: 74.8% in 2008, rising to 76% in
2020.44 The causes of disparate rates of homeownership are in no small
measure due to discriminatory mortgage lending practices as well as
exclusionary land use practices.45
As the crisis set in, the estimated number of foreclosures was predicted to
continue to rise to four to five million in the next two years — absent drastic
intervention46 — and later studies by the Congressional Research Office
revealed that many mortgage holders were not inclined to engage in
foreclosure avoidance courses, instead immediately invoking their contract
rights to recourse in the property.47
A. The Housing Markets Before and After the Crisis
Although the real estate market is peculiarly subject to booms and busts,48
44. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic White Alone in the
United States, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
NHWAHORUSQ156N (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
45. Discrimination in mortgage lending, from disparate lending terms to outright
redlining, continues to burden borrowers of color. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting in More Than $175
Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending Claims (July 12, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-wells-fargoresulting-more-175-million-relief. Discriminatory zoning only makes the problem more
onerous as rates and terms of lending reflect the demographics of the loan area. See AMY
DENINNO, THE ROLE OF ZONING REGULATIONS IN THE PERPETUATION OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY AND POVERTY: A CASE STUDY OF OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA (2019),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/amy_narrative_final.pdf.
46. OFF. OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 8 (Jan. 22, 2009);
Meeting on Priorities for the Next Administration: Use of TARP Funds under EESA,
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 18 (2009) [hereinafter Use of TARP
Funds under EESA] (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Deputy to the Chairman and Chief
Operating Officer, FDIC). In the midst of the crisis, it was feared that the number of
foreclosures would rise to more than 10 million. See also Emmons et al., supra note 38,
at 12; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Oversight of Implementation of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and Efforts to Mitigate Foreclosures,
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor for Policy for
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/1581; Use of TARP Funds
under EESA, supra note 46, at 17 (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Deputy to the Chairman
and Chief Operating Officer, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.). The rate of foreclosures rose in
2008 to 1.84% and continued upward to 2.23% in 2010; not leveling off until 2019, when
the rate dipped to .36%. Foreclosure Rate in the United States from 2005 to 2020,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/798766/foreclosure-rate-usa/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2021).
47. EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34653, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF A FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 9–10 (2008).
48. See Jeffrey P. Cohen et al., The Boom and Bust of U.S. Housing Prices from
Various Geographic Perspectives, 94 FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 341, 360
(2012), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2012/09/04/the-boom-andbust-of-u-s-housing-prices-from-various-geographic-perspectives.
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for most of history, the price of homes kept pace with the rate of inflation.
However, from 1995–2006, house prices diverged from other economic
trends and increased dramatically, by eighty percent.49 But, this rise was
unsustainable — the leverage by borrowers with questionable credit holding
subprime loans could not form the pillars for long-term stability.50 Because
many of the loans were 100% loans, as most of the early payments are
allocated to interest, it would take many years into the loan before the
homeowner would see any equity. When faced with the disruptions in the
market, absent equity, there would be no safe exit by these borrowers.51
The prevailing lending practices also drove housing supply, with record
or near-record levels of homes on the market.52 High supplies, exacerbated
by high foreclosure rates, would necessarily force down housing prices,

49. In 2001, home prices were at their highest ever and in 2006, home prices were
double what they were ten years earlier. See Becky Sullivan & Ari Shapiro, 10 Years
After Housing Crises: A Realtor, A Renter, Starting Over, Staying Put, NPR (Apr. 28,
2018, 7:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/28/603678259/10-years-after-housingcrisis-a-realtor-a-renter-starting-over-staying-put; see also All-Transactions House Price
Index for United States, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/USSTHPI (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
50. The “subprime market” is so defined because the median FICO is substantially
below that for prime loans (620 as compared to 723) and the loans carry high loan-tovalue ratios. To control for the high risk of default given these characteristics, subprime
loans typically have adjustable interest rates, often with a balloon payment of principal
and negative amortization, under which the principal of the loan is not reduced on a
schedule, but rather increases over the term. Under the 2/28 loans, the initial rate is
typically very low and fixed for two years; thereafter, the rate adjusts periodically, in
accordance with some index agreed to in the mortgage for the rest of the term.
Depending on what is happening in the economy, the first adjustment could be a shocker
if the borrower’s financial means did not experience the same increases. Cf. Berghaus
v. U.S. Bank, 360 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting claim of predatory
lending and violations of federal disclosure requirements on account of lender’s failure
to disclose “potential for an enormous rate increase”). The related “Alt-A” market was
also suffering. The Alt-A market consists of borrowers who are typically self-employed
and consequently have unpredictable income streams. Even so, as their credit scores are
a bit stronger, lenders made loans with little documentation and often with a high debtto-income ratio. See SUMIT AGARWAL & CALVIN T. HO, COMPARING THE PRIME AND
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKETS 1–2 (2007), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/
historical/frbchi/fedletter/frbchi_fedletter_2007_241.pdf. If lenders hoped for different
results in the case of the Alt-A borrower, they were sorely mistaken.
51. See LEXISNEXIS, SUBPRIME LENDING: AN UPDATE OF THE ISSUES AND
APPROACHES 23 (2007); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk and the Financial
Crisis: Protecting the Financial System as a ‘System’ 16 (Feb. 12, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the University of California Berkeley School of Law),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Schwarcz_Paper.pdf.
52. See Monthly Supply of Houses in the United States (“MSACSR”), FED. RSRV.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSACSR (last visited Nov. 19,
2021) (tracking housing supply by month).
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which continued to drop through 2010 only to stabilize beginning in 2011.53
These declining prices and stalled markets created the phenomenon of
underwater mortgages; at one point, more than a third of all mortgages in the
country had this characteristic.54 As home values plunged and foreclosures
skyrocketed, local governments were taxed to provide emergency shelter and
social services to the displaced former homeowners and to shore up
communities against blight and instability.55
Market participants appeared to deliberately target the vulnerable to lure
them into burdensome mortgage transactions, without warning of their
eventual costs.56 Subprime loans were the financing forms de jour for
53. See All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States, FED. RSRV. BANK

ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USSTHPI (last visited Nov. 19, 2021)
(depicting housing prices from 1975–2021).
54. The state of being “underwater” exists when the amount owed on the mortgage
loan is greater than the market value of the home. FANNIEMAE, KEYS TO RECOVERY
(2008), https://www.fanniemae.com/media/28871/display; see also ASHLYN AIKO
NELSON, BAILING OUT UNDERWATER MORTGAGES (2010), https://oneill.indiana.edu/
doc/research/mortgages_nelson.pdf (reporting that the percent of underwater mortgages
in the country reached nearly 40% by 2009).
55. See, e.g., Bank of America Corp. v. Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–02 (2017)
(seeking recovery for increased costs of municipal services after many foreclosures of
subprime mortgages); Oakland v. Wells Fargo, 972 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020)
(seeking damages under the Fair Housing Act for reduced tax revenues because of a high
rate of foreclosure of predatory loans).
56. See Christopher Kent, Assistant Governor (Financial Markets) of the Reserve
Bank of Australia, Address to the Housing Industry Association Breakfast: The Limits
of Interest-Only Lending (April 24, 2018), https://www.bis.org/review/r180426f.htm
(discussing the risks of interest-only and negative-amortization loans). It was no surprise
that these loans accounted for the large percentage of delinquencies in the crisis. See
James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RSRV.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 403 (2009), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/
review/2009/09/01/systemic-risk-and-the-financial-crisis-a-primer/ (examining how
subprime loans affected the larger housing market); Christopher Palmer, Why Did So
Many Subprime Borrowers Default During the Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting
Prices? 1 (Apr. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/P5_-_CPalmer-Subprime.pdf (“The subprime default rate — the
number of new subprime foreclosure starts as a fraction of outstanding subprime
mortgages — tripled from under 6% in 2005 to 17% in 2009. By 2013, more than one
in five subprime loans originated since 1995 had defaulted.”); Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Board of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The
Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2017), https://www.bis.org/review/r070522a.pdf
(stating that for subprime “mortgages, the rate of serious delinquencies . . . rose sharply
during 2006 . . . about 11 percent, about double the recent low seen in mid-2005 . . . .
In the fourth quarter of 2006, . . . subprime mortgages accounted for more than half of
the foreclosures.”); MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY 3
(2007), https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2008-03-00%20MBA
%20National%20Delinquency%20Survey.pdf (reporting that in “the fourth quarter of
2007, the foreclosure inventory rate increased 17 basis points for prime loans (from 0.79
OF
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borrowers of color, in diverse neighborhoods, irrespective of credit
standing.57 This was all the more heinous because “yield spread premiums”
were rewards from creditors to mortgage brokers who locked borrowers into
higher-cost loans.58
B. The Regulators Were Watching God59
In the years leading up to the crisis, the regulators did not see that the rise
in mortgage loan originations — up to $2 trillion in 2007 — would
eventually come crashing down.60 Indeed, after the collapse, they shrank to
less than a fraction of that level, to $1.4 trillion, and did not recover until
2012.61 The regulators also did not see the tsunami of defaults at the market’s
edge.62
When the storm was full upon the nation, the regulators reacted with a
variety of measures — including cash infusions into the market (the
Troubled Assets Relief Program or “TARP”),63 interest rate cuts, and
eventually regulatory reforms, most significantly Dodd-Frank.64 Before
percent to 0.96 percent), and increased 176 basis points for subprime loans (from 6.89
percent to 8.65 percent)”); SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI TONG, QUARTERLY MARKET
MONITOR QMM 5-09 (OFF. OF THRIFT SUPERVISION) 5 (May 7, 2009).
57. See Emily Badger, The Dramatic Racial Bias of Subprime Lending During the
Housing Boom, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 16, 2013, 6:54 AM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-16/the-dramatic-racial-bias-of-subprimelending-during-the-housing-boom.
58. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at xxii; Shelby D. Green, Shadowing
Lenders and Consumers: The Rise, Regulation, and Risks of Non-Banks, 37 BANKING &
FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Sept. 2018, at 12, 13; see also Green, Disquiet, supra note 1, at
9 n.9, 10 n.14.
59. ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 235 (1937). In the
midst of a fierce hurricane, the people seemed to stare into the dark, perhaps resigning
themselves to idea that only the almighty could save them.
60. See Samuelson, supra note 6, at 19; Greg Buchak et al., Fintech, Regulatory
Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 23288, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23288.
61. Buchak et al., supra note 60, at 11.
62. Both lenders and borrowers, at best miscalculated, or at worst simply ignored,
their risks. See CRISIS & RESPONSE, supra note 21, at xxiv–xxv, xxxvi.
63. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
64. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech
at the Women in Housing and Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: Financial
Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm
(describing the effects of the housing market on the U.S. economy and response); see
also Glenn Hubbard, Financial Regulatory Reform: A Progress Report, 95 FED. RSRV.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS 181, https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/
review/13/03/181-198Hubbard.pdf (noting how regulators failed to act to avoid the
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discussing Dodd-Frank in some detail, I will take a moment to comment on
the efficacy of the regulators’ immediate responses. Some say that their most
regrettable error was letting Lehman Brothers fail in September 2008.65
Because rather than staunch the hemorrhaging in the market, that bankruptcy
sent out dramatic waves of more panic, which led to the total absence of trust.
No one would lend, which in turn meant no one was spending or hiring,
which ultimately led to the need for the rescue of many other companies.66
Moreover, the regulators failed to employ the available regulatory tools to
curb the rising housing market and the credit surge — increased interest
rates, caps on loan-to-value ratios, and greater capital retention by banks.67
Instead, by allowing the market to operate unconstrained, the regulators left
market participants susceptible to the slimmest changes in market dynamics.
When the waters calmed and Congress was able to discern the lapses, the
Dodd-Frank legislation that followed the emergency responses was largely
prophylactic in nature. Dodd-Frank resulted from the findings of the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, as part of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act.68 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report was issued in January
2011, and in scathing terms made plain that had the regulators been watching
things on the ground — the explosive growth in subprime lending,
securitization, and the unsustainable rise in housing prices — the crisis might
not have happened. 69 In addition, the report noted, as the Federal Reserve
failed to set prudent mortgage-lending standards, banks, both investment and
depositary, bought and sold mortgage securities without scrutinizing them

crisis).
65. At the same time as Lehman Brothers was allowed to fall down, following
measures adopted during the Great Depression, several states enacted moratoria on
foreclosures. See PEW CHARITABLE TR., DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND
TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS 3 (2008), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/reports/2008/04/16/defaulting-on-the-dream-states-respond-to-americasforeclosure-crisis; see Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses To The
Foreclosure Crisis In Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341,
365 (2012). Now and during that earlier frightful period, states passed legislation that
gave borrowers rights to redeem the foreclosed property after sale and limited or
precluded deficiency judgments. See David Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State
Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great Depression, 90 FED. RSRV. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 569, 570, 574 (2008).
66. See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept.
7, 2013), https://www.economist.com/schools-brief/2013/09/07/crash-course.
67. See id.
68. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat.
1617.
69. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, xi, xv–xxviii (summarizing the findings
and conclusions of the Commission).
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for their quality; some even knew they were rubbish.70 Not seeing the trends,
the federal policy makers — the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York — were ill-prepared to respond in a
meaningful way to arrest or at least to minimize the crisis, instead, they were
resigned to let it burn itself out.
It was not just the regulators who defaulted in their oversight
responsibilities, but corporate boards, who at the first line, abandoned sound
decision-making principles and risk evaluation, prudence and ethics,
ignored the long-view and instead were driven only by prospective gain from
the deal on the table in the moment. This fixation left them ill-prepared even
for the most minor shocks in the market.71 Lax loan origination policies,
inflated appraisals, and dishonest ratings of mortgage-backed securities by
the ratings agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, (who were paid
to give high ratings) were some of the more pernicious practices that created
a powerful recipe for implosion and collapse.72
Dodd-Frank outlawed these practices. The legislation aimed to establish
new morals of the marketplace and to protect consumers and lenders in their
loan transactions.73 Recognizing that the work of the then five regulatory
agencies might sometimes overlap or reveal gaps, Dodd-Frank created the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to identify “systemically
important financial institutions” (“SIFI”) and to monitor them for practices
as would threaten the financial stability of the industry.74 Those institutions
would then be subject to heightened regulatory constraints and disclosurebased obligations.75
70. Id. at xvii–xx.
71. Id. at xxii–xxiii. The report found that investment banks operated on only

veneers of capital. For example, at the end of 2007, Bear Stearns was frantically
borrowing up to $70 billion in the overnight market, when it had only $11.8 billion in
equity and faced $383.6 billion in debt. This “was the equivalent of a small business
with $50,000 in equity borrowing $1.6 million, with $296,750 of that due each and every
day.” Id. at xx. In the six years from 2001 to 2007, “national mortgage debt nearly
doubled, and the amount of mortgage debt per household rose more than 63% from
$91,000 to $149,500, even while wages were essentially stagnant.” Id.
72. Id. at xxv, 125–26.
73. Before the 2008 financial crisis, consumer financial protection was largely
performed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal
Trade Commission. The Dodd-Frank Act invested much of this authority into a new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), but bank regulators still supervise
many consumer activities of their chartered firms. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
74. See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability
Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1113–20 (2015) (describing the structure and
mandate of FSOC).
75. The process of labeling a company as “systemically important” has been a
fraught one. When the FSOC designated the insurer MetLife as “systemically important”
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Under Dodd-Frank, “too big to fail” would become but a song.
Instead, firms would be monitored for unsafe practices and be required to
disinvest of certain assets — those that posed “grave threat[s] to the financial
stability of the United States.”76 Portfolios would be required to be diverse77
and institutions would be required to maintain minimum capital levels.78
These requirements would be evaluated by regular “stress tests” to ensure
that firms could survive a variety of economic shocks in the market.79 There
would be prophylactic limits on consolidations and mergers of companies
reaching certain liability thresholds.80 Otherwise, SIFIs would be allowed to
fail and need “living wills” for an orderly liquidation in case of improvident
demise.81 No longer would the Federal Reserve make emergency loans to
specific firms, but “only to participants in a program or facility with broadbased eligibility designed for the purpose of providing liquidity to the
financial system”;82 no longer would the Federal Deposit Insurance
in 2014, MetLife challenged the designation in court, and the district court subsequently
struck down the designation, finding the FSOC failed to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.
See Ryan Tracy, MetLife Asks Appeals Court to Uphold Removal of “SIFI” Label, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2016, 10:38 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-asks-appealscourt-to-uphold-removal-of-sifi-label-1471355267. While the case was on appeal to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the parties agreed to a dismissal.
76. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a).
77. See FDIC, RMS MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 3.2 (2020),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section3-2.pdf.
78. Josh Morris-Levenson et al., Does Tighter Bank Regulation Affect Mortgage
Originations? 6–7 (Jan. 20, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941177, explains that minimum levels of capital serve to
enable firms to absorb market shocks and otherwise to control economic losses. The new
regulations require certain banks to hold enough liquid assets to survive periods where
refinancing is not possible. Id. at 7.
79. See Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014)
(noting that these enhanced capital requirements for SIFIs accord with international
standards). For an in-depth discussion of how stress tests work in practice, see Robert
Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV.
2236, 2290–301 (2014).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (providing that “a financial company may not merge or
consolidate with . . . another company, if the total consolidated liabilities of the
acquiring financial company upon consummation of the transaction would exceed 10
percent of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies”); see also
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, PROPOSED DODD-FRANK LIMIT ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION M&A TRANSACTIONS (2014), https://www.davispolk.com/sites/
default/files/05.27.14.DoddFrank.Concentration.Limit_.on_.Financial.Institution.MA_.
pdf (discussing the concentration limit proposal).
81. See Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act’s Living
Wills: Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29,
39 (2012) (explaining the liquidation planning required by Dodd-Frank).
82. Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, Loans, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,959
(Dec. 18, 2015) (to be codified 12 C.F. R. pt. 201). See generally MARC LABONTE, CONG.
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Corporation (“FDIC”) offer emergency loan guarantees.83 The TARP would
be the first and last bailout.84 Instead, the FDIC would move to liquidate
failing financial firms.85 By these measures, Dodd-Frank aimed to remove
the incentive to act recklessly with the bravado of impunity.
i. Protections for the Hapless Borrower
Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)
to adopt rules for the entire lending process — from loan origination to loan
servicing. 86 The rules would apply to depository institutions and non-banks

RSCH. SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE:
EMERGENCY LENDING (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44185.pdf (examining the use of Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act).
83. For a discussion of the problematic incentives of emergency loan authority, see
Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479 (2015).
84. See Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 55, 57–58 (2010) for a lively critique of TARP.
85. See CRISIS & RESPONSE, supra note 21, at 190–93 (explaining the process of
bank receiverships); 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n).
86. In the aftermath of the crisis, many states adopted a myriad of protections for
borrowers at the initial contracting stage and when facing foreclosure. These protections
include limits on the terms of high-cost loans and required counseling in advance of
taking the loan. The failure to comply with these requirements could be onerous for
lenders. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon, 850 N.Y.S. 871 (Sup. Ct. 2008)
(canceling the entire debt upon violations of banking law on a high-cost loan). In some
states, settlement conferences are required before a foreclosure complaint may proceed,
with the aim of allowing time to cure a default or averting foreclosure altogether. See
Abigail Lawlis Kuzma, Foreclosure in the Heartland: What Did We Learn?, 49 VAL.
U. L. REV. 39 (2015); see also 2008 Enacted Foreclosure Legislation, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEGIS., https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/fore
closures-2008-enacted-legislation.aspx (last updated Jan. 21, 2009) (summarizing
recently enacted foreclosure laws across the fifty states); NEGOTIATED ALTERNATIVE TO
FORECLOSURE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) see also, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1
(McKinney 2021). See generally Geoffrey Walsh, State and Local Foreclosure
Mediation Programs: Can They Save Homes?, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (Sept. 2009),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-media
tion-programs.pdf (considering the efficacy of mitigation programs in to prevent homes
from being foreclosed); NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2021) (discussing mediation);
ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WALK THE TALK: BEST PRACTICES ON THE
ROAD TO AUTOMATIC FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2 (2010), https://www.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/11/pdf/walk_the_talk.pdf
(highlighting the benefits of foreclosure mediation); Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing
Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7
NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 454 (2012) (arguing for regulations to encourage homeownership
and safeguard homeowners); Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses To The
Foreclosure Crisis In Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341
(2011) (examining states’ legislative response to increased foreclosures during the 2008
crisis).
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alike, to ensure fair lending laws market-wide.87 In my view, the most
significant invention of the CFPB is the ability to repay (“ATR”) rule. 88
Under this rule, lenders must make an affirmative determination of a
borrower’s ability to repay the loan, and not just at the initial rate, but over
the loan’s full term in the case of an adjustable-rate mortgage.89 This means
that borrowers must be given a good faith estimate of the monthly payment
amount after it adjusts or resets,90 and must be given six months’ notice that
the mortgage changed from fixed to adjustable.91 To make the ATR
determination, lenders must review hard evidence of creditworthiness, such
as pay stubs and bank accounts.92 Accordingly, “no- or low-doc” loans
cannot be extended.93 The CFPB also adopted the “Qualified Mortgage,” a
safe harbor for lenders whose loan meets the ATR requirements94 and satisfy
specific conditions meant to reduce risk. The loan:
 may not contain the onerous features (negative amortization,
adjustable rates);95
 cannot have a term longer than 30 years;96
 cannot charge points and fees that exceed a specific threshold;97
and
 cannot be made to borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio greater
than forty-three percent.98
For loans that are not qualified, lenders may not assess prepayment
penalties for adjustable-rate and higher cost mortgages nor may they push

87. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c) (2021); see Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter,
Why The Ability-To-Repay Rule Is Vital To Financial Stability, 108 GEO. L.J. 649, 649
(2020) (asserting that the “ability-to-repay rule acts as a circuit breaker that will help
prevent poorly underwritten loans from fueling a future bubble in housing prices that
creates the risk of financial collapse”).
89. Dodd-Frank, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(4).
90. 12 C.F.R. 1026.20(d).
91. See id.
92. Id. §1026.43(c)(3)–(4).
93. See id. § 1026.43(c)(3)(i), (c)(4) (noting the verification requirements).
94. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2), (e)(4).
95. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i).
96. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(ii).
97. Id. § 1026.43(e)(3).
98. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(v); Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z): General QM Loan Definition, 85 Fed. Reg. 86,308, 86,
308 (Dec. 29, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (“For General QM’s, the ratio
of the consumer’s total monthly debt to total monthly income . . . must not exceed 43
percent.”).
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loans with prepayment penalties even if fixed rate, over ones without.99 In
no case may lenders finance worthless credit or other insurance.100 New
rules also require homeownership counseling.101 And, this is telling of the
practices pre-crisis, for loan soundness, the CFPB rules require that the
property is appraised before any deal is closed for higher priced loans,102 and
that the appraiser adhere to industry standards in preparing a report,
including inspecting the interior of the property.103
To make the loan process less opaque, the CFPB substituted the long-used,
but sometimes inscrutable federal mortgage forms, the HUD-1 Settlement
(“HUD-1”) and Truth-in-Lending Disclosure (“TIL”) statements, with two
plain-speaking more accessible forms — the Loan Estimate and Loan
Closing Disclosure Statement.104 The amendments also prohibited deceptive
advertising, banned lenders and brokers from influencing appraisers, and
barred servicers from engaging in unfair servicing practices related to fees
and billing.105
C. Control of Government-Sponsored Enterprises by the
Federal Housing Finance Agency
The crisis could not have caught on without the support from GSEs.106
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, although government-chartered, acted as any
other profit-seeking entity. At their peak, they amassed investment
99. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.43(g)(1)(ii)(A); 1026.43(g)(3).
100. Id. § 1026.36(i). Before Dodd-Frank, it was common to charge steep premiums

for unnecessary credit life insurance and to finance these premiums as part of the
mortgage loan.
101. Id. § 1026.34(5); see id. § 1026.36(a)(5). There are also prohibitions on: 1)
compensation to loan originators by persons other than the borrower, id. § 1026.36(d)(2);
2) the payment of a “yield spread premium” to brokers for selling high-cost loans to
borrowers, id. § 1026.36(d)(1); 3) the steering of borrowers into certain loans, id.
§1026.36(e); 4) the mandatory arbitration and waivers of consumer rights, id.
§1026.36(h); and 5) the making of negative amortization loans to first-time borrowers
without counseling, id. § 1026.36(k).
102. See id. § 1026.35(a)(1) (defining “higher-priced mortgage loan”).
103. Id. § 1026.35(c)(3).
104. See TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosures, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/compliance/compliance-resources/mortgageresources/tila-respa-integrated-disclosures (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) (linking the Loan
Estimate Form and the Closing Disclosure Form).
105. See Green, Testing, supra note 2, at 492; Linda Singer et al., Breaking Down
Financial Reform: A Summary of the Major Consumer Protection Portions of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 2,
4–6 (2010).
106. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 111, 131
(2011); see also Theresa R. DiVenti, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Past, Present, and
Future, 11 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 231, 231–33 (2009).
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portfolios of more than $1.5 trillion. Because the portfolios were
undiversified, consisting almost entirely of home mortgages and securities
backed by them, the GSEs were particularly vulnerable in the crisis, as more
than twenty percent of these mortgages were in default.107 HERA was
enacted to avert their impending collapse. HERA created the Federal
Housing and Finance Agency (“FHFA”), to oversee and essentially control
GSE’s business activities and determine what other activities they would be
allowed to engage in, what assets to hold, and what capital to reserve.108 No
sooner than it was created, the FHFA placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
in “voluntary” conservatorship to shield them from claims and to monitor
their activities.109
III. RISE OF NON-BANKS IN HOME PURCHASE FINANCE
The post-crisis regulatory constraints on banks, seem to have
provided the opening for “shadow banking,”110 that is, financial transactions
by “non-banks.”111 The precarious fiscal state of commercial banks, along
with Dodd-Frank’s heightened capital requirements crippled many banks’
ability to lend.112 Many retreated from the loan origination market
altogether, thinking that the industry was too costly,113 especially because of
new regulations requiring lenders to have some skin in the game by holding
onto some of their loans on their balance sheets and the new liquidity
requirements.114 These constraints seemed to make loan origination
107. GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 12; see also Green,
Testing, supra note 2, at 480.
108. Green, Testing, supra note 2, at 483 (describing the expansive role of the FHFA
to prevent the GSEs from accumulating debt).
109. In Testing, I recount how after the conservatorship was imposed, the missions
and policies of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac changed — from that of making housing
available to the greatest number, to a matter of self-preservation, with sometimes heartrendering impacts on the hapless borrowers, whose mortgages were bought and
foreclosed by the GSEs. See id. at 495.
110. “Shadow banking” has alternative meanings. In some contexts, it refers “to the
funding of loans through securities markets instead of banks — or to the funding of banks
through securities markets instead of deposits.” EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG., RSCH.
SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL
REGULATORY POLICY FOR BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 9 (2013). In other
contexts, it “refer[s] to financial activity that is ineligible for a government backstop,”
i.e., deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Id.
111. Id. at 21.
112. AMIN RAJAN, THE RISE OF PRIVATE DEBT AS AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSET CLASS 3
(2015).
113. Id. at 4; see also Morris-Levenson et al., supra note 78, at 2, 7 (making the
connection between the decline of banks in the loan origination markets and Dodd-Frank
capital and liquidity requirements).
114. See Morris-Levenson et al., supra note 78, at 7 (detailing the effects of the
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economically unprofitable, since the higher capital requirements meant lost
business opportunities as less funds were available for lending.115 With
lower loan-to-value ratios, tightened underwriting standards, and the absence
of government agency guarantees,116 it seemed safer to stay out of the
business altogether rather than risk liability for regulatory lapses.117 The
retreat occurred more often by larger banks118 creating a perfect entry point
for non-banks.119 Non-banks took advantage of historically high yields and
acquired “legacy residential mortgage exposure at very high levels.”120
As the term suggests, non-banks are not depositary institutions, thus their
operations are not at the core of bank regulation. Yet, they have a presence
in all aspects of the credit markets, from mortgage loan origination to payday
lenders.121 Their sui generis character makes them ineligible for government
guarantees, such as deposit insurance, and the Federal Reserve’s emergency
discount window. As I discuss below, the very fact that they are untethered
from the traditional banking system, should prompt us to look for meaningful
reins.
A. Novel Business Models: A Janus Effect
NDNBs are “two-faced,” but not something altogether ugly, as that term
suggests. Instead, the increased market liquidity and diversity of funding
sources aligns well with current financing philosophy and promises to
allocate risks to investors more efficiently. The technology-driven business
models that obviate the need for brick-and-mortar establishments, and
liquidity coverage ratio).
115. See id.at 7–8.
116. Joshua Anderson & Tom Collier, Earning an Illiquidity Premium in Private
Credit, PIMCO (July 7, 2015), https://www.pimco.com/en-us/insights/investmentstrategies/featured-solutions/earning-an-illiquidity-premium-in-private-credit/.
117. See Buchak et al., supra note 60, at 2 (suggesting the path for the entry of fintech
was made by the retreat of banks from the market); see also Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine
Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, & Alternative Pricing 2,
22–23, 26, 38 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017) (noting that
the use of novel algorithms and data sources risks diverging regulations); Kathleen
Pender, Why Big Banks are Losing Out to Nonbank Lenders in Mortgages, S.F.
CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Why-big-banksare-losing-out-to-nonbank-lenders-6106027.php (last updated Feb. 28, 2015).
118. Morris-Levenson et al., supra note 78, at 2.
119. Anderson & Collier, supra note 116, at 3.
120. Id.
121. See Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Speech at the Central Banking in the Shadows: Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
Postcrisis, 20th Annual Financial Markets Conference:
Nonbank Financial
Intermediation, Financial Stability, and the Road Forward (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20150330a.htm.

458

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:3

humans for that matter, are very twenty-first century. They have been
dubbed “fintech”122 as they employ digital tools that operate autonomously
and are thought to produce greater efficiencies for the entity and ease of use
for customers.123 While there will be some losses from the lack of human
judgment in transactions, fintech’s use of alternative metrics for assessing
risk has made home financing more available to a different cohort of
borrowers — those who appear under traditional criteria to be financially
marginal, but under eccentric gauges, not.124
These same characteristics might describe the other, perhaps dark side of
NDNBs — in particular their growing market and their heavy reliance on the
FHA to insure their loans.125 In 2020, of the top five lenders, three were nonbanks, Quicken Loans, United Wholesale Mortgage, and Penny Mac.126 The
market share of non-banks rose nearly three-fold from fourteen percent in
2008 to over fifty percent in 2017.127 The share continued to rise thereafter,
from 58.9% in 2019 to 68.1% in 2020.128 Non-banks sell most of their
122. See infra Part III.B.
123. See Buchak et al., supra note 60, at 2–3 (stating that advances in technology

allow fintech firms to save labor costs, utilize advanced screening processes for loan
applicants, and provide better products and convenience to customers).
124. I discuss these new metrics infra text accompanying notes 133–39.
125. See You S. Kim et al., Liquidity Crises in the Mortgage Market, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 348, 348 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/KimEtAl_Text.pdf (linking the number of lenders engaged
with the FHA and VA to government vulnerabilities to nonbank lenders); Martin N.
Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, INITIATIVE ON BUS. & PUB. POL’Y AT
BROOKINGS 14–15 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf (identifying that “[i]n 2001 there were $2.2 trillion
worth of mortgage originations with 65 percent of these in the form of conventional
conforming loans and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Department of
Veteran Affairs (VA) loans”).
126. See Alicia Phaneuf, The Growing Market Share of Nonbanks and Alternative
Financing in the Online Mortgage Lending Industry, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2021, 10:40
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/alternative-nonbank-mortgage-lending; John
Bancroft, The Battle for Origination Supremacy: Nonbanks at 63% Market Share,
INSIDE MORTG. FIN. (Jun. 25, 2020), https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/
articles/218443-the-battle-for-origination-supremacy-nonbanks-at-63-market-share.
See generally Kayla Shoemaker, Trends in Mortgage Origination and Servicing:
Nonbanks in the Post-Crisis Period, 13 FDIC Q. 51 (2019), https://www.
fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2019-vol13-4/fdic-v13n4-3q2019-article3.pdf
(discussing mortgage trends since the 1970s).
127. See Kathryn Fritzdixon, Bank and Non-bank Lending Over the Last 70 years, 13
FDIC Q. 31, 34 (2019), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2019-vol134/fdic-v13n4-3q2019-article1.pdf; see also Pedro Gete & Michael Rehr, Mortgage
Securitization and Shadow Bank Lending 1, 4 (June 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921691 (discussing the market share of nonbanks in mortgage
origination).
128. Orla McCaffrey, Nonbank Lenders Are Dominating the Mortgage Market, WALL
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mortgages to the GSEs, since nearly eighty percent carry FHA insurance,
which makes them eligible for purchase.129 As market shares have increased,
the requirements on the borrower’s side of financing have changed — the
average down-payment has dropped to 11.4% from 20%130 and FICO scores
have dropped to a median of 710 out of 850,131 very close to the subprime
cutoff.132
B. How the Fin-Tech Non-Banks Operate
As the term suggests, fintech is computer-driven technology with
standards and protocols for manipulating and transmitting data.133 These
firms use complex algorithms that purport to assess credit risk, based on an
analysis of a variety of data — from citizenship or residence status, social
security accounts, and bank account records.134 While FICO scores factor
prominently in this assessment, instead of a credit score,135 non-banks assign
the would-be borrower a credit grade,136 which is calculated based on the
ST. J. (June 22, 2021, 9:11 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nonbank-lenders-aredominating-the-mortgage-market-11624367460.
129. As an example, by the end of 2017, the non-bank share of Ginnie Mae’s
purchases was nearly 60%. Kim et al., supra note 125, at 352.
130. Sara Ventiera, Where Buyers Are Making the Lowest — and the Highest — Down
Payments, RELATOR.COM (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/lowestdown-payment-cities/. This is explained in part by the FHA loan insurance that allows
down-payments as low as 3.5%. See 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(9)(A).
131. What’s the Average Credit Score in America?, CAPITALONE (June 10, 2021),
https://www.capitalone.com/learn-grow/money-management/average-credit-score-inamerica/ (reporting an average FICO score of 710 for 2020). FICO scores are plotted
on a scale of 300 to 850 points. Kevin Outlaw, What is a Good FICO Score?, BANKRATE
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit/what-is-good-fico-score.aspx.
132. Eight years after the crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reported that
the subprime loan was back; in 2014 26% of FHA loans originated from FICO scores
under 660, with 40% between 661–700, which is “near-pime.” Marshall Lux & Robert
Greene, What’s Behind the Non-Bank Mortgage, Boom? 22 (Harv. Kennedy School,
Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov., Working Paper No. 42, 2015),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/working.papers/42_
Nonbank_Boom_Lux_Greene.pdf.
133. See J. Christina Wang, Technology, the Nature of Information, and FinTech
Marketplace Lending 2 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 18–3, 2018),
https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2018/technologynature-of-information-fintech-marketplace-lending.aspx (explaining how Fintech
platforms operate).
134. Id.
135. Credit scores are compiled by the three credit bureaus and are used by the GSEs
in mortgage lending.
136. Wang reports that fintech company, Lending Club, assesses credit risk using up
to 35 subgrades. Wang, supra note 133, at 10. She goes on to comment on studies that
show that these subgrades are seen as an accurate measure “of the relative credit risk, as
evidenced by its rising and now high correlation with the average ex-post default loss
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same factors used by banks, but also on atypical things, such as information
collected from social media accounts, which are used to confirm basic
information on a loan application, such as employment.137 Perhaps most
concerning about the use of social media data is the idea that it helps these
non-banks to discern the would-be borrower’s “character.”138 If this is meant
to refer to the borrower’s willingness to pay her debts as inferred from
payment records, it is of no significance. But, if this is meant to discern
political leanings or cultural affinities, then that is a different matter. For the
lay person, the correlation between social media and credit responsibility is
not obvious, but fintech quants who think in terms of game theory or
regression analysis find this information compelling. The idea is that the
cold, dispassionate algorithms operate to assess a borrower’s likely
propensity for honesty and responsibility, without the influence of human
bias.139 To be sure, human assessment can tilt either way — to deny access
to credit, either intentionally or subliminally.140 However, while an
automated lending system may not be influenced by implicit biases, it may
overlook a case for sympathy, exception, or context.
C. The Regulation of Non-Banks
Should we worry about rise of non-banks in the mortgage loan origination
market? The same impetus — regulatory myopia, cupidity for lenders and
investors, and naiveté by both borrowers and lenders — that led to increased
regulation of banks following the crisis should animate responses to nonbanks. This concern was raised by the previous Vice Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, Stanley Fischer, when he pointed to the non-banking sector
as a potential weak link in the chain of sound market transactions.141 In
rate.” Id. at 11; Julapa Jagtiani et. al, Fintech Lending and Mortgage Credit Access 24–
25 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 19-47, 2019), https://www.
philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2019/wp19-47.pdf.
137. Wang, supra note 133, at 13.
138. Id. at 13 n.26. In fact, Wang reports that in 2011 through 2012, Lending Club
relied so heavily on its algorithms for deriving credit grades that it essentially ignored
credit data, such as income, employment status, and length of employment provided by
the loan applicants. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 14.
140. See Jagtiani et. al, supra note 136, at 4, 11 (“In fact, . . . fintech lenders
discriminate less than traditional, face-to-face lenders.”).
141. Fischer, supra note 121, at 1–2. Fischer highlighted the case of New Century,
the second-largest non-bank originator, which collapsed and set in motion waves of
disruptions throughout the financial industry. Even before the crisis, non-banks were
subject to the existing Truth in Lending Act standards and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act; however, these laws proved ineffective in avoiding unfair and unsafe
lending. See Eric S. Belsky & Nela Richardson, Understanding the Boom and Bust
in Nonprime Mortgage Lending 107 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
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enacting Dodd-Frank, Congress had some awareness of this vulnerability
and the need for shoring up, but not subjecting non-banks to specific capital
requirements.142 Instead, it named non-banks as “covered persons,”143 which
by focusing on the particular activities in which they engage, their enterprise
comes under federal scrutiny for market risk,144 bringing both banks and nonbanks into alignment for purposes of consumer protection regulations.145
Yet, even knowing the CFPB is watching, some non-banks still cross the
line. Recently, two mortgage companies were caught defrauding potential
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ubb10-1.pdf; Michael Flaherty &
Howard Schneider, U.S. Regulators Struggle in Effort to Tackle Shadow Banking,
REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2015, 1:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-shadow
banks/u-s-regulators-struggle-in-effort-to-tackle-shadow-banking-idUSKBN0MS51X
20150401; Ryan Tracy, SEC Official: ‘Not Clear’ Bank Regulation Has Made Economy
Safer, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/01/secofficial-not-clear-bank-regulation-has-made-economy-safer (reporting that “Fed Vice
Chairman Stanley Fischer floated several ideas for regulating shadow banks, some of
which might take SEC action to implement”); see also U.S. TREASURY, A FINANCIAL
SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: ASSET MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 63 (2017); IRIS H.Y. CHIU ET AL., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHADOW
BANKING: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 7 (Iris H.Y. Chiu & Iain MacNeil eds.,
2018) (mentioning generally what shadow banking is and the regulatory challenges that
come with it); Yesha Yadav, Too Big to Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 589–
91 (2018) (discussing the overall “scant” regulatory attention given to banks).
142. See KARAN KAUL & LAURIE GOODMAN, NONBANK SERVICER REGULATION 3
(2016), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/78131/2000633-NonbankServicer-Regulation-New-Capital-and-Liquidity-Requirements-Don%27t-OfferEnough-Loss-Protection.pdf (noting how nonbanks “have not been subject to the same
level of supervisory financial regulation and capital requirements” as larger banks).
143. Under 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C), the CFPB has the authority to supervise any
covered person it “has reasonable cause to determine, . . . is engaging, or has engaged,
in conduct that poses risks to consumers concerning offering or provision of consumer
financial products or services.” This authority extends to
(1) nonbank covered persons of any size that offer or provide: (a) origination,
brokerage, or servicing of loans secured by real estate for use by consumers
primarily for personal, family or household purposes, or loan modification or
foreclosure relief services in connection with such loans, (b) private education
loans, and (c) payday loans; and (2) ‘larger participant[s] of a market for other
consumer financial products or services, as [the Bureau defines] by rule . . . .’

Procedural Rule To Establish Supervisory Authority Over Certain Nonbank Covered
Persons Based on Risk Determinations, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,352 (July 3, 2013) (to be
codified at 12. C.F.R. pt. 1091).
144. See CONSUMER FIN. P ROT. B UREAU, 2014 CFPB D ODD-F RANK M ORTGAGE
RULES READINESS GUIDE 3–7 (3d ed., 2014), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201409_cfpb_readiness-guide_mortgage-implementation.pdf (providing a list and
interpretation of newly enacted mortgage loan origination and servicing rules).
145. See U.S. TREASURY, REFORMING WALL STREET PROTECTING MAIN STREET 9
(2012), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/20120717_DFA_FINAL.
pdf (displaying a graphic showing both nonbanks and traditional banks under enhanced
federal supervision).
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customers, service members and veterans with intentionally distorted
advertising regarding the company’s VA guaranteed loans.146 One company
advertised credit terms it had no intention of offering, while failing to clearly
disclose the terms of the loans it did provide.147 In refinancing loans, the
company misrepresented how much cash it was willing to give.148 The other
company falsely characterized adjustable rate loans as fixed rate to get
borrowers to apply and falsely represented that impossibly low FICO scores
would qualify for the best interest rates.149 The company’s advertisements
also falsely implied that it was a government affiliate.150
IV. EMERGING NEW MODELS FOR HOME PURCHASE FINANCE
A. Installment Land Contracts
Leaving non-banks’ practices for the moment, let us go on to discuss the
alternative models — some old and venerable and some novel — being
employed by these entities to assist in achieving home ownership. The use
of installment loan contracts for a home purchase is not new, but what is new
is using them to repurchase homes lost in foreclosure during the housing
crisis. Despite a long history in property law, these devices became very
popular after the 2008 crisis, when speculators were buying up properties at
foreclosures as an investment strategy.151 An “installment land contract,”
also known as a “contract for deed,” had long-been viewed as an attractive
financing device for those with poor credit or who are unable to save the

146. CFPB Settles with Two Mortgage Companies Over Misleading VA Loan
Advertisements, BUCKLEY (Aug. 25, 2020), https://buckleyfirm.com/blog/2020-0825/cfpb-settles-two-mortgage-companies-over-misleading-va-loan-advertisements#
page=1.
147. Id.
148. Id. The ads violated CFPA, Mortgage Acts and Practices — Advertising Rule
(MAP Rule), and Regulation Z. Both cases were settled. “In addition to a $260,000 civil
money penalty, the consent order require[d] the company to enhance its compliance
functions, [including] to designate a compliance official to review mortgage
advertisements for compliance with consumer protection laws, and comply with certain
enhanced disclosures requirements.” Id. In the second case, in addition to a $150,000
civil money penalty, the consent order required the appointment of a compliance official
to ensure mortgage advertisements comply with consumer protection laws. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Ryan Dezember, After the 2008 Housing Crisis, a Lot of People Made Big
Money Buying Up Foreclosed Homes and Renting Them Out — and It Shows One
Response to a Financial Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2020, 9:20 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/after-2008-housing-crisis-people-bought-and-rentedforeclosed-homes-2020-8.
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traditional 20% down payment for a mortgage loan.152 Crisis investors have
taken advantage of the confluence of tightening credit and housing shortages
to sell these newly foreclosed homes through the contract for deed at
substantial markups over the foreclosure purchase price153 and sometimes
selling them back to the foreclosed owner. As with mortgage loan
origination, some parties on the other side of these deals were targets for
unscrupulous practices. African-American and Latino homebuyers,154 those
unsophisticated and inexperienced, have been the prime market for these
deals.155 Ostensibly innocuous devices, the contract for deed and the related
rent-to-own scheme,156 come with significant risks, all the while lacking the
required disclosures (e.g., physical defects or the presence of lead paint) and
limits on terms that come with mortgage financing (e.g., maximum interest
rates, balloon payments, prepayment penalties, or protections in case of
default).157
152. See Cystal Myslajek, Risks and Realities of the Contract for Deed, FED. RSRV.
BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2009/risksand-realities-of-the-contract-for-deed.
153. Fannie Mae has asserted that “the bulk sale program for hard-to-sell homes
accounted for a small fraction of the 900,000 homes it has sold since the financial crisis,”
many of them run-down and sold at bargain prices. Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra
Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers Traps Low-Income Buyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/business/dealbook/market-for-fixer-upp
ers-traps-low-income-buyers.html.
154. In ‘Contract for Deed’ Lending Gets Federal Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/business/dealbook/contract-for-deed-lend
ing-gets-federal-scrutiny.html, reporters Matthew Goldstein and Alexandra Stevenson,
recount the case of Harbour Portfolio, which bought more than 6,700 single-family
homes for an average of $8,000 each in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Florida, Georgia,
Pennsylvania, and a handful of other states since 2010, for the purpose of reselling them
by contract for deed. Most of the homes were burdened by mortgages held by Fannie
Mae but sold in bulk after the crisis. See also JEREMIAH BATTLE ET AL., TOXIC
TRANSACTIONS: HOW LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS ONCE AGAIN THREATEN
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (2016); JAMES H. CARR ET AL., STATE OF HOUSING IN BLACK
AMERICA (2016).
155. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, How a Home Bargain
Became a ‘Pain in the Butt,’ and Worse, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/business/dealbook/how-a-home-bargain-became-a-pain
-in-the-butt-and-worse.html (reporting on a 2017 suit filed by the Atlanta Legal Aid
Society, against Harbour Porfolio, claiming that the firm “targeted African-American
communities to sell contracts for deed on at inflated prices”).
156. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 122–55 and infra text accompanying
notes 157–89.
157. See Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Seller-Financed Deals Are
Putting Poor People in Lead-Tainted Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/business/dealbook/seller-financed-home-salespoor-people-lead-paint.html (reporting that many of the homes sold by Harbour Portfolio
were in severe states of disrepair). For an interesting discussion of the plight of
homeowners in Detroit, among other cities, facing tax foreclosures, see Bernadette
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For some foreclosed homeowners, buying back their property through an
installment land contract is the only way of regaining homeownership, since
the right to redeem the property at foreclosure, has been frustrated by rules
adopted by the GSEs that prohibit not-for-profit entities from purchasing
property in foreclosure on behalf of the foreclosed owner.158 Legal
challenges to these rules have all failed.159 In other cases, would-be home
buyers are unable to obtain a bank loan or come up with a down payment so
they enter into a long-term contract for purchase.160
Despite their important role in facilitating home ownership for would-be
buyers living paycheck to paycheck, installment land contracts are difficult
to embrace warmly because they are fraught with risk on both sides of the
transaction. However, these risks are primarily present on the buyer’s side.
While the buyer has the immediate right to possess, during the long
executory period, so much could go wrong. The buyer having only equitable
title, bears the risk of loss from casualties — acts of God and woman.161 The
seller, holding legal title could encumber it exposing the buyer to loss by a
prior claimant.162 Moreover, because the buyer is usually charged with
maintaining the property, in case of a default, as traditionally conceived, she
stands to lose everything — all the payments, all the improvements and all
the appreciation in value. Additionally, the usual forfeiture clauses mean no
restitution.163 In the case of purchasers of foreclosed properties, there were
Atuahene & Christopher Berry, Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax Assessments and the
Epidemic of Tax Foreclosure, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 847 (2019) (reporting on a study of
tax assessments in Detroit, during the period after the housing crisis of 2008, showing
that from 2011 to 2015, Wayne County, Michigan foreclosed on approximately 100,000
Detroit properties for unpaid property taxes, which was more than a quarter of all
properties in the city); see also Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CAL. L. REV.
107 (2020) (describing how through practices such as improper tax assessments, many
cities are systematically and illegally, taking property from residents only to vest in
public coffers).
158. See Green, Testing, supra note 2, at 500.
159. See Green, Testing, supra note 2, at 530–31.
160. See Amy Fontinelle & Rachel Witkowski, Land Contract: What It Is & How It
Works, FORBES (May 25, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/mortgages/what-is-aland-contract/ (explaining how these contracts work and how a would-be home buyer
can still move towards home ownership without the same challenges of traditional home
purchasing).
161. SARAH MANCINI & MARGOT SAUNDERS, LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS: THE
NEWEST WAVE OF PREDATORY HOME LENDING THREATENING COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
10 (2017), https://www.bostonfed.org/home/publications/communities-and-banking/
2017/spring/land-installment-contracts-newest-wave-of-predatory-home-lending-threat
ening-communities-of-color.aspx.
162. Id.
163. Id. (explaining that without a clause providing protections otherwise, a buyer’s
default leads to “punitive forfeiture of all amounts paid”).
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additional worries about the properties’ physical condition. These sales are
typically “as is,” and with no right to inspect other than from the sidewalk,
putting the risks of defects and the restoration burden on the buyers. Finally,
as buyers under contracts for deed often fail to record their contracts, they
are at risk of losing all of their investments to a subsequent purchaser without
notice of the contract.
But the general evolution in the law as it pertains to deals in real property,
such as the implied warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant relations and
the abandonment of caveat emptor in favor of disclosures by sellers of
defects, has not entirely bypassed parties to installment land contracts.
Indeed, in the last several decades, there has been a steady movement to
reconceptualize the contract for deed away from that of an executory contract
toward one that comports more with its essence, a conveyance of an interest
in land.164 After all, the buyer in possession with the contractual obligation
and self-interest to maintain it and pay taxes, looks very much like an
owner.165
Looking to the essence of that deal, then employing a legal fiction based
on the maxim that equity regards substance and not form, courts and
legislatures are treating the former vendor/vendee relationship as a
mortgagor/mortgagee relationship, with the seller retaining the legal title,
merely for purposes of security — just like a mortgage. As a mortgagee, the
vendee becomes required to extinguish the vendee’s interest, not simply by
declaring a default and forfeiture, but by foreclosure.166 Just as in the
traditional mortgage context, a foreclosure by sale is hoped to generate a sum
to compensate the vendor for what remains on the debt and possibly to create
a surplus, which would go to the vendee. Even as some courts do not
reconceptualize the nature of the parties’ transaction, they apply contract
tools and equitable powers to reach a fair and equitable result.167 Rather than
164. Fontinelle & Witkowski, supra note 160 (highlighting the importance of
negotiating for protection clauses and other provisions to safeguard the buyer’s property
interest).
165. Sometimes contract for deed programs are successful. Two programs, one in
Minnesota, Bridge to Success, and one operating in sixteen states, Battery Point
Financial, buy properties in foreclosure to resell by contracts for deed. Both Bridge to
Success, which utilizes pre-purchase counselling, and Battery Point Financial, which
rehabilitates homes and sells them under 20-year contracts, comply with CFPB
regulations for high-cost mortgages.
166. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973) (finding it
inequitable, that, if forfeiture were to be enforced, the defaulting defendants would lose
over half of their purchase price and the right to possess the home); Bean v. Walker, 464
N.Y.S.2d 895 (App. Div. 1983) (reversing the lower court’s holding that the defaulting
vendee lacked rights); Eric T. Freyfogle, Vagueness and the Rule of Law: Reconsidering
Installment Land Contract Forfeitures, 1988 DUKE L.J. 609 (1988).
167. Associated Bank-Milwaukee v. Wednt, No. 00-0483, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS
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allow forfeiture, courts permit a beleaguered vendee to cure a default; some
vendees may be awarded restitution of amounts paid in excess of the land
value.168 Some borrowers may be entitled to reinstatement of the contract
after default by paying what was owed at the time.169 These inventions were
long-coming and reveal a much needed reform in the law. Yet, because they
only operate after the deal has been consummated and performance is well
underway, they do little to help the naïve borrower before undertaking the
obligation in the first place. 170
B. Rent to Own and Seller Financing
In a rent to own model of home purchase finance, tenants/buyers have the
option to purchase the home they are renting from the landlord/seller, usually
within a specified amount of time. This arrangement gives the tenant/buyer
an opportunity to see the value of the home and neighborhood up close and
operates as a hedge increases in home prices. It is one of the few home
purchase options for renters with less than stellar credit. Typically, the rent
payments will be applied as a down payment on the home and the renter will
seek a traditional mortgage for the balance.171 Sometimes, the seller offers
to finance the purchase with the renter signing a promissory note, along with
a purchase money mortgage, in favor of the seller.172
On the surface, rent-to-own plans seem to be a good thing, but more often
than not, they serve to pass off a property otherwise unsellable because of its
physical condition. That was the case in Rainbow Realty Group, Inc. v.
Carter.173 There, Cress Trust offered four alternatives to consumers
interested in its housing stock: “straight sale, straight rental, land contract,
192, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2001) (stating that “foreclosure actions are subject to
equitable considerations”).
168. See, e.g., Peterson v. Hartell, 707 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1985); Rosewood Corp. v.
Fisher, 263 N.E.2d 833 (Ill. 1970).
169. Peterson, 707 P.2d at 234 (holding that even after a willful default, a vendee can
redeem her right to the property by making all payments due); Rosewood, 263 N.E.2d at
837–40 (holding that the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute does not apply to purchasers
under land sale contract).
170. The FHFA is conducting a review of some of the terms of deals between
investors and purchasers of GSE property, and the CFPB has begun to look into
consumer protection violations by these companies. This could result in Fair Housing
Act violations if the investors are targeting a particular cohort based on race or ethnicity
and if the forfeiture provisions operate to make housing unavailable. See Fannie Targets
‘Abusive Seller Financing’ Sales, DAILY REAL EST. NEWS (May 25, 2017),
https://www.iprore.com/news/fannie-targets-abusive-seller-financing-sales.
171. Jean Folger, Rent-to-Own Homes: How the Process Works, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/updates/rent-to-own-homes/ (last updated Oct. 12, 2021).
172. Id.
173. 131 N.E.3d 168 (Ind. 2019).
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and rent-to-buy contract.”174 A married couple with a good monthly income
but a poor credit history entered into the “rent-to-buy contract,” signing a
“Purchase Agreement Rent to Buy Agreement,” for a single-family house.175
The agreed price was $37,546, payable at $549 per month to be paid over the
course of thirty years with 16.3% interest.176 Under the agreement, the
couple took the property as is, acknowledging that it was not in “livable
condition,” that it was their responsibility to “make it habitable” prior to
moving in, and that their renovations and improvements would thereafter be
considered attached to the real property.177 The agreement stated that the
parties intended to execute the sale and clarified that the payments for the
first twenty-four months would be considered “rental payments.”178 After
these payments, a “Conditional Sales Contract (Land Sale)” would be
entered into for twenty-eight years.179 The house was in miserable condition
— toilets were missing, plumbing and electric wiring were defective; there
were no door locks; windows were broken; the basement stairs were
unusable; and carpets were destroyed beyond repair.180 There was virtually
no flooring; trash was everywhere and animals had taken up nests inside.181
When the couple failed to make payments as agreed, Cress Trust sued to
evict in small-claims court.182 The couple counterclaimed, alleging injury
from Cress Trust’s failure to make the premises habitable as required by the
landlord-tenant statute.183 The trial court ruled for defendants on the
counterclaim, but the court of appeals reversed.184 The Indiana Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court. It explained that even though the agreement
was designated “a contract” and contained attributes of a contract of sale —
stating the home was purchased “as is,” with no warranty of condition, and
labeling the transaction a “sale” — the form and labels did not determine the
legal status of the deal.185 The court observed that if the agreement were a
contract of sale, the couple were homeowners and thus, not subject to
eviction in small-claims court, where the landlord brought its action.186 Most
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 171–72
Id.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
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telling was that the agreement referred to “rental payments” for the first 24
months, which the landlord was entitled to keep on eviction.187 Because a
landlord-tenant relationship had arisen, the landlord had a duty to make the
premises habitable.188 The result in this case was an enlightened one, but
there may be many other courts who are less sympathetic, leaving the
renter/owner at the mercy of the deal they made.
C. Alliances and Joint Ventures Between the
Borrowers And Financers
As the above discussion shows, the primary attractive feature of
installment land contracts and the rent-to-own arrangements is that they
facilitate initial entry into homeownership. Nevertheless, there are
discernable limits on that ownership. For the installment land contract, the
buyer holds only an equitable title until the full purchase is paid. In the case
of rent-to-own agreements, the renter holds only an option to buy if she is
somehow later able to find traditional financing. The new models discussed
below purport to help the buyer acquire full and immediate title. However,
the investments made by NDNBs may result in novel claims and rights that
may not fit within the existing taxonomy of ownership rights. Below, I
discuss specific NDNBs in turn and offer an analysis of their shape and
content later.
i. Fleq
The Fleq™ website states: “You get one life. Own it. At Fleq, we believe
home ownership is attainable without a large down payment. Without
difficult credit standards. Without taking on massive amounts of debt. And
without long-term commitments.”189 Fleq is just one of a growing number
of NDNBs that have emerged since the 2008 housing crisis.190 On their face,
these firms seem to achieve the twin goals of homeownership with little risk.
The name, Fleq, suggests its model: “flexible” and “equity.”191 It “partners”
with homebuyers into an “alliance” to purchase a home,192 making the
homebuyer both owner and tenant. The process of acquiring a home and

187.
188.
189.
190.

See id. at 172.
Id. at 177.
FLEQ, https://fleq.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
See Kelsey Ramirez, Startup Explains Its New, No-Mortgage Homeownership
Model, HOUSINGWIRE (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/startupexplains-its-new-no-mortgage-homeownership-model/ (“Many firms are trying to
improve the affordability of homes and the attainability of mortgages . . . .”).
191. See FLEQ, supra note 189.
192. Id.
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forming the alliance is described in these steps.
 The would-be homebuyer finds a home, sometimes using a broker
recommended by Fleq.
 Credit and background checks are made, then Fleq forms an
“alliance” with the homebuyer. The costs — the monthly
payment, which is comprised of rent, ownership costs, and fees,
and the initial equity contribution to the alliance — are calculated,
an appraisal is ordered, and an inspection of the property’s
physical condition is conducted.
 The respective percentages of ownership are determined as well
as the amounts required for increasing those shares, but rent paid
by the homebuyer cannot be used to acquire additional equity in
the home.
 After payments of the initial equity contribution, a membership
fee and part of the closing costs, the purchase closes. 193
D. Equity Sharing: The Spoils of Appreciation
In the equity sharing arrangement, a financer is an investor in the
transaction and purchases a portion of the homeowner’s equity. In return,
the homeowner accepts a contractual limit on her equity appreciation. When
the value of the property changes, there is a risk and reward trade-off for both
the borrower/homeowner and the lender/investor.
i. How the New Equity Sharing Models Work
a. Haus
The Haus program, offering a “co-investment partnership,” is available to
both current homeowners (for tapping into homeowner equity) and wouldbe homebuyers.194 Like other “co-investors,” Haus advertises that the funds
are not a mortgage or debt but an investment in the home.195 These are the
components of the Haus model:
 After approval, Haus determines how much the buyer must
initially put down and funds the balance of the purchase price.
 The buyer makes monthly payments to buy back the equity from
Haus.
 The monthly payments include the “monthly equity purchase, a
fee, homeowners’ insurance, and property taxes.”
The
193. Id.; Ramirez, supra note 190. Fleq may further assist the homebuyer in
managing title issues, arranging for homeowner’s insurance, and setting up escrows.
194. HAUS, https://haus.com/faq (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
195. Id.
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homeowner is free to increase the amount of equity payments
during the term but must maintain a minimum percentage of
ownership. The homeowner is allowed to “cash out,” by selling
back equity to Haus for personal use, and the monthly payment is
adjusted accordingly.
Payments are fixed for ten years.196
After ten years, if the homeowner has bought back all of Haus’s
equity, the home is owned outright. If the homeowner has not
purchased all of the equity, they can choose to renew the
partnership, buy-out the remaining Haus equity, or sell the home
to a third party.197
b. Noah

The newest fintech firm engaged in home purchase finance is Noah,
another form of equity-sharing arrangement.198 Noah’s technological
platform develops “a full financial profile of [its] homeowner partners,” even
for those in marginal financial circumstances, proclaiming itself the “the
financing source of last resort.”199 Noah’s prequalification process is not
unlike that for traditional mortgage refinance, where the terms depend on the
market value of the property, available equity, and the homeowner’s credit
standing. It is all done online through Noah’s customer portal. The process
is fast and can be completed in as few as fifteen days. Despite the outward
similarities, Noah’s financing is not secured by a “mortgage” on a home loan,
rather it is described as a “debt-free investment agreement.”200 Homeowners
do not make monthly payments or interest, but a one-time lump sum to Noah
at any time during the relationship.201 Noah uses a holistic approach,
considering more than just an applicant’s credit score, to determine the value
and terms of the arrangement.202
Suppose Noah co-invests $100,000 in the purchase of a home, this is how
196. Id. Haus claims that, compared to a traditional mortgage, these payments are
30% less. Haus Raises $7.1M to Bring Flexibility and Affordability to Homeownership,
BUSINESSWIRE (July 18, 2019, 11:17 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20190718005549/en/Haus-Raises-7.1M-to-Bring-Flexibility-and-Affordabilityto-Home-Ownership.
197. HAUS, supra note 194.
198. Benjamin Horney, Home Equity Financing Fintech Noah Nabs, $150M In
Funding, LAW360 (April 22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1266276/homeequity-financing-fintech-noah-nabs-150m-in-funding.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. How it Works, NOAH, https://www.noah.co/how-it-works (last visited Nov. 20,
2021).
202. Id.
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the plan operates:
 It first determines the Adjusted Home Value.
 It then offsets risk through a valuation adjustment, which
typically ranges from 10% to 20%.
 This adjustment reduces Noah’s exposure to downturns and
amplifies its returns in a rising market.
 As Noah’s co-investment of $100,000 was contingent on
receiving a 30% equity share, if the home’s value increases to
$1,343,916 at the end of the ten-year term, Noah’s payout is
$233,175; it’s a gain of $133,175, at an annualized return on
investment of 8.83%.203
c. Unison
Perhaps seeing what was over the horizon, Unison entered the home
finance business in 2004, just before the worries about a crisis began to take
shape. Like the GSEs and other private participants on the secondary market,
Unison is funded by institutional investors, such as pension plans and
university endowments.204 It offers to “partner” with homebuyers, not by
making a loan, but instead by making a co-investment in the buyer’s home
— such as by providing part of the down payment and sharing in the homes
appreciated value.205 The Unison partnership makes homeownership
possible as it eases the down payment burden — the buyer paying as little as
five percent, while Unison pays the balance of the traditional twenty
percent.206 The loan to value ratio (eighty percent) under the Unison model
is the same as under the traditional borrowing scenario and Unison sets
specific qualifications to ensure that the home is a good long-term
investment that is likely to appreciate.207 Unlike a mortgage, no interest is
charged on Unison’s down payment contribution, and the homebuyer does
not make monthly repayments. Instead, Unison recoups its investment on
203. This is a hypothetical based on the Noah concept. See also Colin Robertson,
Noah: A Home Equity Sharing Product, TRUTH ABOUT MORTG. (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.thetruthaboutmortgage.com/noah-review-a-home-equity-sharing-product/
(explaining how the Noah model works).
204. Where Does Unison Get Its Funds?, UNISON (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.unison.com/article/about-unison-funding.
205. Robert Farrington, Unison Review: Uniquely Use the Equity in Your House,
COLLEGE INV., https://thecollegeinvestor.com/24159/unison-review/ (last updated Nov.
18, 2021).
206. Liz Brumer, Unison Review: Capturing Home Equity Through Shared
Appreciation, MILLIONACRES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.fool.com/millionacres/realestate-financing/unison-review-capturing-home-equity-through-shared-appreciation/
(last updated May 19, 2021).
207. See id.
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the eventual sale of the home. In this partnership, Unison stays in the
background, assuring the homebuyer that she is sole owner of the home and
that Unison is merely an investor with “no rights of occupancy” or control.208
Besides enabling the initial purchase, Unison also helps homeowners tap
into the equity of their existing homes. Unison will give cash for a part of
the equity, in exchange for a percentage share of the home’s future
appreciation.209 For example, Unison will convert up to $500,000 or 17.5%
of a home’s value to cash in exchange for a portion of its value when the
homeowner decides to sell.210 Unlike a home equity loan from traditional
lender, the Unison “co-investment” does not encumber the property with
more debt, nor does it require contemporaneous repayment as the cash out is
only repayable at the end of the partnership agreement, which is the earlier
of the sale of the home or thirty-years from signing. Unison is not in these
deals for charity; instead, it may earn a substantial profit if the value of the
home increases during the life of Unison’s “investment.”211
There are certain restrictions and tangential costs attached to both the
“HomeOwner” and “HomeBuyer” programs. For instance, as part of the
agreement, Unison sets a “Maximum Authorized Debt Limit,” meaning that
any future refinancing will be subject to limitations.212 Homeowners must
pay all third-party closing costs as well as a 2.5% origination fee213 and are
subject to periodic credit checks.214
d. Point
Point is another business model that invests in the equity of existing
homes. While there are surface similarities to Unison in the sense that Point
does not lend money, as would require monthly repayments, Point is
different in several structural respects: buyout, caps on points return, and
rights to rentals. These are the features of Point:
 Homeowners are required to own at least thirty percent of the
208. How It Works for a Homeowner, UNISON, https://www.unison.com/
how_it_works_homeowner (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) (“If I partner with Unison, who
owns the home? You own the home!”).
209. Brumer, supra note 206.
210. Id.; UNISON, supra note 208.
211. Brumer, supra note 206; UNISON, supra note 208.
212. UNISON HOMEOWNER PROGRAM
GUIDE 48 (2017), https://seeking
alpha.com/uploads/2017/11/11/5068968/Unison_HomeOwner_Program_Guide.pdf.
213. Brumer, supra note 206.
214. Unison requires a certain FICO score, which is the same as a credit check. Your
Homeowner Questions Answered, UNISON, https://www.unison.com/faq_homeowner
(last visited Nov. 20, 2021). As another example, Hometap is an equity sharing company
that is very similar to Unison. The Smart Way to Tap into Your Home’s Equity,
HOMETAP, https://www.hometap.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
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equity in the home.
The homeowner has the right to buy out Point or pay off the
investment by sale of the home at any time during the thirty-year
term with no pre-payment penalty.
Point’s return is capped at a set amount, usually twenty-five to
forty percent of the appreciation value.
The homeowner has the right to rent out the property, upon
payment of a “small rental premium” to account for any decreases
in value of the home from wear and term from use, such as the
natural depreciation from a renter’s presence.215

ii. Other Alternative Financing Models
a. P2P Mortgage Loans
Peer-to-peer (“P2P”), lending helps homebuyers by making available
loans from groups of individual lenders, who desire to help those that
otherwise lack the means for accessing capital. In this respect, P2P lenders
tend to operate in underserved markets — making loans to borrowers with
marginal credit standing; even so, P2P loans typically carry lower interest
rates than those charged by traditional lenders.216 They are open to hearing
the borrower’s “story,” which purports to capture all aspects of the
borrower’s circumstances as would allow a fully, and perhaps sympathetic
assessment of the borrower’s application for capital. This wide-ranging
application process does come with the cost of a much slower procedure.
P2P loans offer the flexibility of a “mix-and-match option,” under which
borrowers can use a P2P loan for the down payment and seek a conventional
loan for the balance of the purchase price.217 While reports show that more
than thirty percent of Americans have used P2P lending, many banks are
reluctant to accept P2P funds as a down payment on a conventional loan.218
The reasons for this hesitancy are not clear. It seems that what might be the
main concern, priority of claim, could easily be addressed by an agreement
215. Most Popular FAQs, POINT, https://help.point.com/collection/1-homeowner-faq
(last visited Nov. 20, 2021); see also Hal M. Bundrick, Shared Appreciation: Tapping
Home Equity Without Taking a Loan, NERDWALLET (Aug. 9, 2019), https://
www.nerdwallet.com/blog/mortgages/shared-appreciation-tapping-home-equity-with
out-taking-out-a-loan/.
216. Bob Schneider, Peer-to-Peer Lending Breaks Down Financial Borders,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-the
ory/08/peer-to-peer-lending.asp.
217. Id.
218. See End of the IOU: P2P Payments the New ‘Social Norm’, BANK OF AM. (May
11, 2017), https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-releases/consumer-banking/endiou-p2p-payments-new-social-norm.
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under which the P2P loan would be subordinate to the bank loan.219 This is
typically how these arrangements are handled. Ostensibly, P2P lending
looks like purchase-money mortgages.220
While this form of lending is not necessarily a “non-debt” means of
financing a home, it is certainly a non-conventional option.221 The process
can be compared to “crowdfunding,” a popular platform used to invite
contributions for sympathetic causes or to launch some invention.
iii. Novel Home Purchase Assistance Programs
a. “Alternative” iBuyers
As the homebuying experience can seem inscrutable at worse and timeconsuming at best, companies have emerged to make the whole process
worry- and stress-free. For customers needing to sell an existing home while
looking to purchase a new one, Homeward is the answer. Acting for the
homebuyer, Homeward purchases the new home, usually all-cash, while the
customer hires an agent to sell the existing home.222 In the interim, the
customer enters into a lease with Homeward for the new home until the old
home is sold (typically for periods up to six months).223 The customer will
acquire a new mortgage to purchase the new home from Homeward at the
original price plus a two to three percent convenience fee, but this may vary

219. See Frank Addessi, The Risks and Rewards of P2P Lending, SMARTASSET (Mar.
14, 2018), https://smartasset.com/personal-loans/the-risks-and-rewards-of-p2p-lending.
220. See id.; Jim Probasco, P2P Mortgage Loans — A Growing Trend, INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/071515/p2pmortgage-loans-growing-trend.asp.
221. Jean Folger, 5 Problems With Buying a House With a Friend as an Investment,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/073015/5-commonINVESTOPEDIA,
problems-buying-house-friend.asp (last updated June 29, 2021), offers some caution for
friends purchasing a home together: the credit status of the friends will be tied together;
exiting the relationship may be difficult without a prior agreement; and the friendship
may be tested as disagreements over use or transfer arise. See also Rachel Stults, What
to Do When Buying a House With a Friend — And Why You Probably Shouldn’t,
REALTOR.COM (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.realtor.com/advice/buy/how-to-buy-ahome-with-friends-and-why-you-probably-shouldnt/. For an example of a “successful”
friendship buying experience, see a case detailed by Julie Beck, The Case for Buying a
House with Friends, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.the
atlantic.com/family/archive/2019/12/how-buy-house-friends-without-goingcrazy/603538/.
222. Mary A. Azevedo, Homeward Secures $371M to Help People Make All-Cash
Offers on Houses, TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://tech
crunch.com/2021/05/27/homeward-secures-371m-to-help-people-make-all-cash-offerson-homes/.
223. Id.
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depending on location.224 The whole process purports to be risk-free, as
Homeward guarantees to purchase the old home at the predetermined price
if it has not sold on the market within the period agreed to.225 This guarantee
appears to remove much of the risk of a stagnant market and helps the
homeowner avoid having to take out a second mortgage loan while the first
home is awaiting sale.226
V. PROMISES AND RISKS FROM ALTERNATIVE BUYING
AND FINANCING MODELS
A. The Lure into the Shadows: Muddy Rights and Remedies
We should worry about the novel practices and non-banks in the home
purchase world,227 for the promise of low down payments and no monthly
payments are but surface appeals, with real risks lurking beneath. I lay out
several kinds of risks that exist.
i. Costs
The non-debt models are not without monetary costs. They specify
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Mary A. Azevedo, Austin-Based Real Estate Startip Homeward Secures

$105M in Debt & Equity, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (May 14, 2020), https://news.
crunchbase.com/news/austin-based-real-estate-startup-homeward-secures-105m-indebt-equity/. Several other companies, like Offerpad and Opendoor, offer similar
services to make the homebuying experience seamless, with their “one stop shops”
through their “iBuyers” programs. See Jeff Andrews, The Real Estate Transaction is
Broken. Tech Companies Want to Fix It, CURBED (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.
curbed.com/2019/3/21/18252048/real-estate-house-flipping-zillow-ibuyer-opendoor;
Jeff Andrews, These Startups Make Selling Your House as Easy as Possible, CURBED
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/4/12/17221178/opendoor-offerpad-sellhouse-online-offers; Courtney Read, What is an iBuyer?, OFFERPAD (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://blog.offerpad.com/what-is-an-ibuyer/; Joe Gomez, What is an iBuyer —How It
Works and Is It Worth It?, OPENDOOR, https://www.opendoor.com/w/guides/what-is-anibuyer (last visited Nov. 20, 2021). Another company, Knock, while not an iBuyer, also
uses “data science and local experts to set a list price on your home,” which then becomes
the “trade-in price” of the home. While the homeowner pays these costs, Knock will
advance up to $25,000 for upgrades to improve the marketability of the home. KNOCK,
https://www.knock.com/faq (last visited Nov. 20, 2021). When the transactions are
completed, Knock earns a 6% commission from the homeowner and a 3% commission
from the seller of the new home.
227. See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT
(2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2019AnnualReport.pdf
(examining risks to financial stability in the United States in various markets and
sectors); Debra Kamin, Is iBuying Here to Stay?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/realestate/ibuying-ilending.html
(describing risks and potential drawbacks of using ibuying and ilending).
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maximum investment amounts ranging from $400,000 (Hometap) to
$500,000 (Unison).228 The minimum share of investment ranges from
$25,000 (Point) or 17.5% (Unison), with maximums from 20% (Point) to
70% (Unison).229 The stated investment terms are either ten years (Hometap
and Noah) or thirty years (Point and Unison).230 The fees assessed are 1) 3%
of the financing amount, appraisal, and third-party fees (Hometap); 2)
Servicing Fee of $2,000 or 3% of the financing amount, whichever is higher,
underwriting, appraisal, and third-party fees (Noah); 3) 3%-5% of the
financing amount, appraisal, and third-party fees (Point); and 4) 3% of the
financing amount, which includes appraisal and third-party fees (Unison).231
When maturity arises after thirty years or if the homeowner sooner sells
the property, Unison claims a share of the appreciation as valued from the
date of the transaction. The share will vary depending on the deal but could
be as high as “the original co-investment plus or minus their share of the
home’s change in value.”232 That payment to Unison may be greater than
the homebuyer would have paid in interest to a traditional lender. This is
how the numbers add up. For 10% of the down payment, Unison earns
33.3% of the change in value as determined by an independent appraisal
when the homeowner chooses to end the relationship, either at sale of the
property, buy out of Unison, or at the scheduled termination point, i.e., 30
years. For 15% of the down payment, Unison would earn 49.5% of the
increase in value.233
If the homeowner decides to sell the home within three years, Unison may
invoke a “Special Termination” payment, which is the original investment
plus an investment option, starting around 3.3% of the property value.234 If
the homebuyer does not maintain the property, she may be subject to a
“Deferred Maintenance Adjustment.” 235
228. Frequently Asked Questions, HOMETAP, https://www.hometap.com/faqs/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2021); UNISON, supra note 214.
229. UNISON, supra note 214; POINT, supra note 215.
230. UNISON, supra note 214; Point, supra note 215; Still have questions? We’ve got
answers, NOAH, https://www.noah.co/faq (last visited Nov. 20, 2021); HOMETAP, supra
note 228.
231. See supra note 230.
232. UNISON, supra note 214.
233. See id.; What is an Option Contract, UNISON (Apr. 11, 2019) (on file with author)
(demonstrating how the option contract with Unison works).
234. UNISON, supra note 214.
235. Id. In its FAQ, Unison describes ordinary wear and tear as allowed, but that
damage exceeding ordinary wear in tear is “assessed by one or more appraisals,
inspections or repair estimates obtained from independent third-party providers who are
used to determine the amount of the Deferred Maintenance Adjustment” and defines a
Deferred Maintenance Adjustment as “allocating the loss in value due to improper
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How does Unison compare in terms of cost to a traditional mortgage? It
depends on whether the property appreciates in value, in which case, the
Unison investment — the down payment and eventual share — will cost
more. Conversely, a traditional mortgage loan does not involve sharing of
equity with the lender. But, if the value of the property declines, Unison is
the better deal. In summary, the Unison model makes sense for the budgetstressed homebuyer — as initial payments are low — who expects to be
better off financially in the future. It also makes sense for homebuyers in
markets experiencing modest gains in appreciation, in which case the down
payment assistance and comparatively low monthly payments will mean
most of the gain is kept by the homebuyer.
ii. Contracting and Consumer Protections
As explained above, mortgages given to an institutional lender are subject
to a host of federal and state regulations designed to protect banks from
excesses, the markets from systemic risks, and borrowers from their
improvidence.236 Adherence to the ATR regulations and loan disclosure is
critical if we are to avoid another housing crisis.237 But, as the structure of
financing offered by the equity sharing partners and alliances does not
involve a “mortgage” per se, none of these protections are available. There
are no disclosures about the economics of the deal, nor even about the
financer’s business model.
The appeal of the benefits seems like the same lures that drew in buyers
to ARMs leading to the crisis.238 Then, as now, homebuyers may be inclined
to overlook the downsides in favor of the immediate satisfaction of
homeownership. Just as subprime loans were made to credit-risky borrowers
or exposed borrowers to greater risks because of adjustable interest rates and
interest only terms, equity-sharing arrangements use less stringent standards
for evaluating an applicant’s credit worthiness. Although FICO scores for
first time borrowers have been dropping in recent years even for
mortgages,239 the metrics used by the non-banks are unconventional and
maintenance to [the homeowner].” Id. There are otherwise no standards for determining
where to draw the line.
236. See supra Part II.B.
237. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 88, at 649.
238. See generally Eric S. Belsky & Nela Richardson, Understanding the Boom
and Bust in Nonprime Mortgage Lending (Sep. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ubb10-1.pdf
(explaining
the
appeal secondary benefits had to buyers).
239. Aly J. Yale, Lenders are Loosening the Reins; What FICO Credit Score Do You
Need to Get a Mortgage?, MORTG. REPS. (Dec. 25, 2017), https://themortgage
reports.com/34667/mortgage-fico-scores-drop.
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unproven. Indeed, the “co-investment” business model is unchartered
territory and raises a host of issues that could trap even the economically
savvy millennial.240 Many of these businesses are not forthcoming with the
specific terms of the agreements and borrowers do not appear to be
encouraged to consult with an attorney. Instead, several of them suggest
borrowers speak with an in-house consultant to make sure the borrower is
“fully informed” prior to signing the agreement.241 Additionally, while “coinvestment” businesses advertise that they are sharing in “all” the risk, the
fine print indicates that for platforms such as Point and Unison borrowers are
required to pay back some or all of the initial investment, at the very least,
even if the home depreciates in value. 242
iii. Novel Forms of Rights
The Fleq Alliance and equity sharing arrangements suggests new forms of
ownership, defying numerus clausus.243 Under numerus clausus, only
certain forms of property rights are recognized as such by the legal system.
This limited recognition circumscribes the private parties’ ability to craft
novel rights and obligations.244 The main reason asserted for this principle
is the interest in “‘optimal standardization,’ that is, balancing economic and
social demand for different types of property interests against the need to
economize on information costs imposed on third parties that have to
accommodate to such diversity, in view of the in rem nature of property
rights.”245
Professors Arruñada and Lehavi explain:
240. See Larry Kochard, Commentary: Overcoming the 4 Most Common CoInvestment Obstacles, PENSIONS & INVS. (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.pionline.
com/industry-voices/commentary-overcoming-4-most-common-co-investmentobstacles (discussing the difficulties of the “co-investment” strategy).
241. NOAH, supra note 230; POINT, supra note 215; HOMETAP, supra note 228;
UNISON, supra note 214.
242. See supra note 241.
243. See FLEQ, supra note 189.
244. Benito Arrunada & Amnon Lehavi, Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime
Era: Toward Innovative Models of Homeownership, 8 BERKELY BUS. L.J. 1, 19 (2010)
(citing UGO MATTEL, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 39 (2000)).
245. Id.; see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24–42 (2000). Some
maintain that information and transaction costs from novel forms can be controlled
through the requirement that parties seeking to use them give some sort of public notice,
and through the adoption of rules to guide our understanding of the arrangements. See
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 395–
409 (2002).
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This does not necessarily mean that recognized types of property rights
included in the “closed list,” such as ownership, should essentially adhere
to a single blueprint, i.e., an indivisible fee simple interest in both the land
and the home.246 At the same time, for new models that “rearrange”
ownership to become formally institutionalized, the new format needs not
only to become de facto familiar to various stakeholders, but should also
be supported by enabling legislation and regulation. This support and
familiarity would allow actors such as lenders to fully understand the
nature of the property configuration and the type of collaterals, and
consequently to be willing to extend credit.247

While there may be good reasons for not rigidly adhering to this principle,
such as where its rationale is not implicated,248 that is not the case with these
new inventions. The structure and nature of their claims to an interest in the
property are not readily apparent from the ground. Because the relationships
may not be evidenced by a recordable instrument, discovering the claims
may not be possible, and the resulting claims against the property may not
fit within the traditional regime, from which there are specific rights,
remedies, and schemes for resolving conflicts.
a. Property or Contract Rights
Rights in property acquired under these new models may be limited in
idiosyncratic ways. In the Noah model, the relationship is described as an
“equity-sharing contract,” that refers to “homeowner partners.”249 Fleq

246. Other writers have pointed out practical and normative differences in the concept
of traditional property rights across different social contexts and different types of
resources. See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1558–70
(2003) (discussing “institutions of property” ranging from those regulating arms-length
market transactions to marital property); Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO.
L. J. 1987, 1997–2000 (2008) (noting that different values implicate the ordering of rights
to various resources).
247. Arrunada & Lehavi, supra note 244, at 19.
248. In Community in Property: Lessons From Tiny Homes Villages, 104 MINN. L.
REV. 385 (2019), Professor Lisa T. Alexander challenges the numerus clausus
proposition by offering the phenomenon of the tiny homes village as a new kind of
property interest. The contours of this new form of housing tenure or property relation
is complex and nuanced. As she describes it, the interest in tiny homes villages lacks a
“formal title,” yet operates much like traditional rights, in the sense of some security of
tenure and the obligation and self-interest to maintain. While there are limits on the right
to alienate, some tiny villages allow participants some share in the appreciation in value
when they decide to leave. In Professor Alexander’s view, the absence in this
stewardship model of all those attributes normally associated with ownership
(unqualified rights to exclude and to alienate) does not disqualify it from the canon of
property interests.
249. NOAH, supra note 230.
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purports to create an “alliance,” that refers to a “joint venture.”250 If we treat
them as they are denominated, then the rules of business associations should
apply. This means equal participation in management, sharing of liabilities,
formalities for dissolution, and fiduciary duties. As contracts, then the rights
and remedies are measured in some ways by default rules — implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, anticipatory repudiation,
impossibility — but subject to bargain. It is unlikely that there will be much
bargaining between the would-be homebuyer and financer, as the
arrangements suggests an etched in stone character. In any case, the usual
remedies will mean actions against the parties, but not against the property
as would be the case with property interests.
As property interests, the lines are equally blurred. If the deed, the written
evidence of ownership, names parties other than or in addition to the
homebuyer, then all the rights of ownership are diminished, as the
homebuyer will lack the apparent ability freely and unilaterally to transfer
title or to give lesser rights. A deed that names parties in addition to the
homebuyer will give those parties rights of possession and perhaps rights to
veto decisions by the homebuyer over the use and changes to the home.
Under the Unison model, the homeowner is typically not permitted to rent
out the property and must keep the home in good condition.251 Who decides
on the quality and extent of improvements and repairs? If they are co-owners
of joint venture property, can the homeowner seek partition? The Fleq
Alliance does not specify relative claims and rights in the context of a divorce
proceedings between married homebuyers or where the homebuyers fall into
a bankruptcy proceeding. How do the financers protect their interests in case
of involuntary transfers? There is a risk on the other side as well — what if
the investor is in bankruptcy? Is the house an asset of that debtor’s estate?
These seem to be the same kinds of risks facing a vendee under an
installment land contract, but at least there, the vendee, if she is in
possession, can give notice by that possession of her equitable claim to the
property to later purchasers. In the title examination phase, the nonpossessing co-investor may be willing to accept risks of title, thought
unsuitable by a single homebuyer? The non-possessing co-investor may be
content with title insurance proceeds if defects manifest themselves later, but
a possessing owner, may not want the risk of losing ownership.
b. A Mortgage by Another Name
The equity sharing company, Unison, states that it does not offer loans but

250. FLEQ, supra note 189.
251. UNISON, supra note 214.
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options for investment.252 Because it is not a loan, the homeowner is not
required to make monthly payments to retire it, nor is she obligated to pay
interest. Because Unison enables the homebuyer to make a larger down
payment, private mortgage insurance may be avoided, and the monthly
mortgage payments are smaller.253 But, where does Unison’s investment
stand in terms of priority of claims? What are Unison’s rights in case the
homebuyer doesn’t fulfill his side of the bargain? The claim clearly does not
fit the traditional notion of a mortgage.254 All the usual recourses and
protections, notice of default, right to cure, and to redeem in case of a default,
leaves homebuyers quite exposed. At the same time, the NDNB lacks those
recourses available to a traditional mortgagee in case the co-venturer fails to
fulfill his part of the deal.
i. Shared Appreciation Mortgage Comparison
One ready comparator to the shared equity investor model is the shared
appreciation mortgage (“SAM”), which emerged in 1980.255 SAMs enable
reduced monthly payments, which in turn means less annual income
252. See Brumer, supra note 206.
253. See UNISON, supra note 214 (explaining Unison’s services and comparing

Unison to alternatives such as a second mortgage, an FHA loan, or a gift fund).
254. See generally David Waddilove, The “Mendacious” Common-Law Mortgage,
107 KY. L.J. 425 (2019) (examining the critiques of the “common-law mortgage” and
interpreting the common-law mortgage in the context of the seventeenth century and
judicial interventions to the doctrine since then). The first mortgages took the form of a
fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, under which the borrower transferred legal
title to a lender, which title would terminate on law day when the debt was repaid. The
conveyance was structured with this language: “To lender, but if borrower pays by
September 1530, borrower has the right to reenter and retake the land.” However, this
arrangement put the borrower at great risk. If on law day, the borrower was unable to
repay the loan — he fell off his horse — the failure to repay, meant forfeiture of all
payments made to that point as well as of the land. Borrowers appealed to equity for
relief and the courts obliged by offering the “equitable right of redemption” — borrowers
could thus pay late. But, because the courts of equity did not specify a date by which
late payments must be made, this left lenders in a very precarious position. They in turn
appealed to equity and this appeal gave rise to “strict foreclosure,” that is, that the
borrower was required to pay by a date certain or forever lose the property. Eventually,
courts came to see that strict foreclosure was too very harsh, such that they required
foreclosure by sale on the theory that a public auction might generate funds to repay the
lender as well as some surplus to the borrower. Alas, that was only the theory, as studies
over the centuries reveal that rarely do public sales generate any surplus to the borrower,
but only minimize her ultimate liability to the lender. However, in several states, lenders
are denied any deficiency judgment against the borrower. See GRANT NELSON ET AL.,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 199–210 (6th ed. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: MORTGAGES §4.1 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1997); Bennett v. Bank of E. Or., 167
Idaho 481 (2020).
255. Shared Appreciation Mortgage, 45 Fed. Reg. 66801 (proposed Oct. 8, 1980) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. 545.6-4(b)).
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necessary to buy a home. It does this through a two-tiered system of interest:
a) a fixed, below-market interest, payable for the term and b) “contingent
interest,” payable as a percentage of the appreciation in the value of the
property, either at loan maturity or on sale or transfer of the property.256 The
percentage of value is determined at the inception of the loan and may not
exceed forty percent of the net appreciation.257 That appreciated value is the
difference between the sales price as market value and the costs — original
costs (purchase price, closing costs, including real estate commissions, title
insurance, appraisals, inspections); capital improvements; and outlays for the
appraisals to calculating appreciated value.258 While the SAM is amortized
as a forty year loan, the actual term is much less, only ten years.259
While there are superficial comparisons between the SAM and the equity
sharing home financing models, there are significant differences on several
points:
 Required disclosures: At bottom, a SAM is a mortgage that is
memorialized in an instrument that contains language to give
notice of its claim to part of the value of the property, and in
closing the loan, lenders must make disclosures to the borrower
on the economics of this financing device.260 With a SAM, the
lender must show the borrower how the mortgage aligns with a
fixed-rate mortgage in terms of cost, based on the fixed interest as
well as the contingent interest. To do this, the lender must make
an honest representation of the anticipated rate of appreciation of
the property.261 None of these requirements exist for the equity
sharing models; only the percentage of appreciation is specified
in the closing documents.
 Economic Benefits: The SAM benefits the lender if the rate of
appreciation is as great as the contingent interest rate is fixed at
the inception. But the borrower remains obligated to pay the
principal of the loan, no matter if the value declines. Conversely,
under the Unison model, the risk of the home not appreciating in
value, falls entirely upon Unison and Unison’s expectation of gain
256. Stanley L. Iezman, The Shared Appreciation Mortgage and the Shared Equity
Program: A Comprehensive Examination of Equity Participation, 16 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 510, 515 (1981); see also ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., FACILITATING SHARED
APPRECIATION MORTGAGES TO PREVENT HOUSING CRASHES AND AFFORDABILITY
CRISES (2008).
257. CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 256, at 8–9.
258. Iezman, supra note 256.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 516.
261. Id.
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can be short-circuited if the homeowner sells the property or buys
it out after five years,262 in which case, any future gain goes
exclusively to the homeowner.
Consequences at the end of the term: Under both models, if the
borrower is unable to sell the property profitably, she may have to
refinance the loan at then prevailing interest rates and if she is
unable to find a loan that is affordable, she might find herself in a
forced sale, where all parties stand to lose. On this point, the two
models, equity sharing and the SAM, are alike in terms of the dire
consequences confronting the homebuyer at the end of the loan or
investment period. They both may require a substantial payment
of unrealized appreciation, even as the homebuyer or borrower
may lack the liquid funds to make this payment.263 In both cases,
the choices of the obligor are limited — take out a new
conventional loan, and incur substantial transactions costs (fees,
time, lost opportunities), or sell the property. The potential loss
of home looms large in both scenarios.264
Liability upon death of the homeowner: The obligation to
repay a SAM continues to burden a borrower’s estate after his
death. While the Unison model requires the heirs or the estate of
the homebuyer to settle the Unison agreement after a 180-day
grace period, it is not clear how Unison enforces this right.265
c. Landlord-Tenant

As described above, Fleq forms an alliance with the homebuyer who
becomes both an owner and a renter, with the option to buy equity in the

262. What is an Option Contract, UNISON, supra note 233. As stated earlier, the
buyout amount is the sum of Unison’s original investment plus a share of the change in
value of the home, which is determined by an independent appraisal. While the
homeowner is entitled to a “Remodeling Adjustment” for improvements that add value
to the home, improvements cannot be made during the first five years of the agreement.
263. See Arrunada & Lehavi, supra note 244, at 34 (suggesting that at the end of a
loan period under the shared-appreciation mortgage, a borrower may lack liquidity and
force her to take a conventional loan or sell the house).
264. See id.
265. Your Questions, Answered: Advanced Topics, UNISON (last visited Nov. 21,
2021), https://www.unison.com/ (lacking a clear answer to this issue); see also Creative
Financing for Home Purchases: What’s Available Now? MCKISSOCK (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.mckissock.com/blog/appraisal/18584/; Is Unison Home Co-investing
Legit?, CLARK (June 6, 2019), https://clark.com/homes-real-estate/unison-home-coinvesting/; James Rufus Koren, This Company Will Help With a Down Payment, But It
Wants a Stake in Your New Home, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-home-equity-investments-20170106-story.html.
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property.266 While the outward appearance may be the classic landlordtenant relationship, with the “tenant” having exclusive possession, Fleq does
not assume the role of landlord, with the significant obligation of making
sure the premises remain habitable under the implied warranty of
habitability, instead placing that burden on the tenant. Most courts do not
allow a waiver of the warranty.267 The court in Rainbow saw through the
contract label and evaluated the relationship for what it was, a landlordtenant relationship.268 Is “the alliance” a landlord-tenant relationship in
disguise? If it is, what form of tenancy is it — tenancy for years or tenancy
at will? What happens when the tenant fails to make the rental payments?
Does Fleq have the right to terminate the tenancy and seek possession in a
summary proceeding?
B. Remembrance of Looming Systemic Risks
The growing power and means to control the housing finance market by
non-banks is cause for concern. Studies show that the growth of non-banks
poses risks to borrowers, communities, and the U.S. government alike.269
And because of the identified weaknesses in their business models, they
remain just as vulnerable to a significant and sustained macroeconomic
shock.270 The same lax underwriting standards indicted as large contributors
to the 2008 crisis, since circumscribed by bank regulations, now define the
holdings of non-banks.271 In general, mortgage loans from non-banks are of
poorer quality than those originated by banks, and are being made to
homebuyers with less income and wealth, and less business sophistication,
272
than those originated by banks.273 And this seems to be the consciously

266. Frequently Asked Questions, FLEQ (last visited Nov. 21, 2021), https://
fleq.com/faqs/.
267. See, e.g., Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019)
(holding that the agreement met the statutory requirements to subject the parties to a
landlord tenant relationship, including warranty of habituality).
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 125, at 349 (outlining the vulnerabilities of nonbanks).
270. See id. at 387.
271. Lux & Greene, supra note 132, at 7.
272. Kim et al., supra note 125, at 390; see also Neil Bhutta et al., Disparities in
Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RSRV.
(Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparitiesin-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.
htm (describing various trends in homeownership by race, ethnicity, and socio-economic
status).
273. Kim et al., supra note 125, at 390.
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adopted business model.274 Recent reports show that non-banks originated
a significantly higher share of mortgage homes loans to minority borrowers
and in low- to moderate-income neighborhoods,275 than the number made by
large banks.276 By the objective measure of FICO scores, the loans made by
non-banks carry lower expectations of performance — more than half were
to borrowers whose FICO scores were below the 660 benchmark for
demarcating prime from subprime loans.277 While this presence in
underrepresented communities might otherwise be applauded, we should
worry if these efforts are the same kind of setup that led to so much economic
and psychological grief in these communities during the crisis.278
Just as before, the GSEs and banks are playing a large role in this new
drama — the GSEs purchasing most non-bank loans and banks making them
warehouse loans279 in the background. Despite the apparent constraints
imposed by the conservatorship under HERA, the GSEs are heavily invested
in loans originated by non-banks.280 These loans are not much different from
those that were the culprits in the financial crisis and are still more costly

274. The Quicken Loan ads for its “rocket mortgage” and the Lending Tree pajamaclad puppet aim to put viewers at ease about borrowing.
275. Kim et al., supra note 125, at 390.
276. As stated, the good part about this new world of lending is that loans are
accessible to Black and Hispanic borrowers and as they live in low-or moderate-income
tracts, see id. at 351, yet, there are some troubling underwriting dynamics still operating.
This cohort of borrowers is less likely to have college degrees and have less income and
wealth. Id. at 390. They have a higher debt-to-income ratio, at the same time, having a
FICO credit score lower by five points for GSE pools and twenty-five points for Ginnie
Mae, making the chances of default significantly higher. Id. at 392.
277. Lux & Greene, supra note 132, at 22.
278. Buchak et al., supra note 60, at 19–20 (finding that fintech and shadow bank
loans are more than .02% likely to go into default than traditional bank loans).
279. Id. at 11. Warehouse lenders typically fund 95% of the mortgage balances,
lending $40 billion at the end of 2016. Id. at 12–13. See generally Peter Rudegeair et
al., Big Banks Find a Back Door to Finance Subprime Loans, Lending to Nonbank
Financial Firms Surges to Record as Banks Avoid Direct Exposure, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
10, 2018, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-find-a-back-door-tofinance-subprime-loans-1523352601 (stating that while banks describe this new lending
approach as “safer than dealing directly with consumers with bad credit . . . [it] mean[s]
that banks are still deeply intertwined with the riskier loans that they say they swore off
after the financial crisis”). Heavy reliance upon warehouse lending by non-banks puts
them in a precarious existence if their loans are called in on margin or are subject to
market-to-market reevaluations.
280. FHFA, R ECENT TRENDS IN THE E NTERPRISES’ PURCHASES OF M ORTGAGES
FROM S MALLER L ENDERS AND N ONBANK M ORTGAGE COMPANIES 16 (2014)
(“[N]on-banks accounted for 26.3 percent of agency purchase mortgage loans originated
in December 2012, by December 2014, that number had grown to 48.37 percent.”); see
also AEI Housing Center, AEI, www.housingrisk.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
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than those from banks, despite the support of the GSEs and Ginnie Mae.281
Because they are dependent on short-term credit to finance their operations,
they may experience losses from contraction if these sources become more
expensive or non-existent in a tight financial market.282 Moreover, because
their business model is novel and decentralized, they are challenging to
monitor and constrain,283 and due to their small size, they may regard the
effects of excessively risky activities as merely abstract.
As with all technology-dependent operations, hacking — in recent times,
carrying huge ransom demands — is an ever-present threat.284 The new
technology employed by NDNBs to assess credit risk may not lead to better
assessments but would instead mask risk factors. 285 This point should not
be rejected out of hand as the ravings of a luddite. The algorithms developed
to evaluate applications that use unorthodox sources and types of data, such
as insurance claims, utility bills, social networks, data from Amazon
purchases, and eBay transactions may only reveal frequencies of occurrence,
but not necessarily meaningful correlations.286 After all, how does buying a
classic Burberry raincoat on eBay predict whether one is likely to make
timely mortgage payments? It may show that the would-be borrower is
frugal, buying used and not new, or it might just as well show him to be
profligate — a store brand coat would keep the rain away just as a classic
one. This is not to say that a human assessment of creditworthiness is better,
but only that we should not take technology as infallible. While these
algorithms have not yet been tested in times of market turmoil, at least in

281. In fact, despite the strong market support offered by the GSEs and Ginnie Mae,
non-bank loans carry interest rates that are 3.7 basis points higher than loans made by
banks. Buchak et al., supra note 60, at 21–22; see also Neil Buchak & Aurel Hizmo, Do
Minorities Pay More for Mortgages, Finance and Economic Discussion Series (Fed.
Rsrv, Finance and Economics Series No. 2020-07, 2020), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/econres/feds/do-minorities-pay-more-for-mortgages.htm (concluding that
minority borrowers pay more for mortgages).
282. See Kim et al., supra note 125.
283. William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2018);
see also Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 232, 235 (2018) (describing the risk implications of fintech in consumer
finance).
284. Magnuson, supra note 283, at 1201–02; see Nicol Turner Lee et al., Algorithmic
Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms,
BROOKINGS (May 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-biasdetection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/.
285. Jagtiani et al., supra note 136, at 5. Those who borrow from the Lending Club
have a higher risk of becoming delinquent. Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 117, at 31.
286. Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 117, at 2, 26–28.
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other areas of trading, it is widely believed that algorithmic high-speed
trading has contributed to instability in markets.287
C. Untethered and Operating in the Shadows
As I suggested at the beginning of this paper, non-banking is sometimes
referred to as “shadow banking,” and this is for good reason. In many ways,
they operate outside of the larger regulatory regime which places a premium
on disclosures — to consumers288 — and on public scrutiny. This is so
because of non-banks’ decentralized structure, consisting of a series of
dispersed networks with discrete functions.289 The asymmetric systems of
information access make it difficult to monitor them and anticipate industry
harm.290 In such a scenario, there is little incentive to look out for or avoid
relationships whose risks are apparent or could be discovered with a little
investigation.291
Unlike depository institutions, non-banks do not have Community
Reinvestment Act (“CRA”)292 obligations; nor an affirmative legal
obligation to lend in any specific geographic area, but they are enjoined from
engaging in practices that discriminate. Recently, the CFPB brought the
first-ever redlining complaint against a non-bank, in Bureau of Consumer
287. The Long-Term Capital Market Program, at its debut, was widely celebrated
because of its leveraged trading strategies premised on computer models. However, the
models lacked the judgment required to abandon the strategies before it was too late,
leading to the eventual collapse of the hedge fund, threatening billions in losses, but it
was bailed out by the government. See Adam Hayes, Long-Term Capital Management
INVESTOPEDIA
(May
3,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/
(LTCM),
terms/l/longtermcapital.asp.
288. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum (Nov.
14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.
html.
289. Magnuson, supra note 283, at 1169.
290. See From the People, for the People, THE ECONOMIST (May 7, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21650289-will-financial-democracywork-downturn-people-people (describing peer-to-peer lending companies, such as
Lending Club).
291. Magnuson, supra note 283, at 1213 (discussing the balance of long-term and
short-term interests). Magnuson posits that fintech may have long-term incentives to
maintain a reputation for providing high-quality, reliable loans and investment
opportunities; but, where the long-term interests of the company and the short-term
interests of the managers of the company diverge, it is far from clear that the long-term
interests will win out. See id.
292. 12 U.S.C. § 2901. The Act requires depository institutions to designate an
assessment area or assessment areas. Then, the depository institutions must act to serve
the credit needs of the entire area — including low- and moderate-income areas, which
typically will overlap with predominantly minority areas. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.41 (2022);
see also Jagtiani et al., supra note 136, at 2 (stating that in CRA assessment areas with
fewer than ten banks, fintech loans are more prevalent than loans from other nonbanks).
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Financial Protection v. Townstone Financial Inc.293 The CFPB alleged that
Townstone engaged in redlining by acts calculated to discourage
applications based on race, including staff making disparaging comments
about Black residents and certain minority populated areas, failing to market
in those areas, and failing to employ non-whites as loan officers.294 The
CFPB has tried to overcome the hurdle posed by the absence of CRA
obligations by “leveraging the concept of a Reasonably Expected Market
Area (“REMA”)”295 or a “Proper Assessment Area,” as a basis for evaluating
claims of redlining.296
VI. CONCLUSIONS: NECESSARY REFORMS AND CONTROLS
It is fair to ask whether the regulations coming out Dodd-Frank went too
far, particularly as we see that tighter lending standards made loans largely
unavailable to many in marginal economic circumstances. The new
regulations sensibly called for greater scrutiny in extending credit to protect
both the borrower and the lender, but they should not disqualify them
wholesale.
While the NDNBs present many differences from the financing tools that
were prevalent prior to the 2008 housing crisis, ARMs were not at all novel
when they were used. It was the indiscriminate deployment that led to the
crisis. Then, as now, there is the need for controls on both sides of the
transactions. NDNBs should be regulated by rules precisely calibrated to
their particular features,297 be subject to registration procedures that are
simple,298 and be subject to centralized regulation.299 What this might look
like must come from both imagination to design different kinds of legal
relations, and fear of relieving a dark period in our financial history. At a
293. Complaint, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Townstone Fin., Inc., No. 1:20-cv04176 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2020). The CFPB alleged violations of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Regulation B. 15 U.S.C. 1691(a). Id.
294. Id. at 4–13.
295. The FDIC has offered guidance to banks on how to determine the appropriate
geographic area to avoid charges of redlining. See Are You at Risk for Redlining?
Understanding Your Reasonably Expected Market Area (REMA) and CRA Assessment
Area, FDIC DIV. OF DEPOSITOR & CONSUMER PROT. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.
fdic.gov/news/events/sf-region/2018-03-14-rema-cra-presentation.pdf.
296. Id.
297. See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future Is Here,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 547–49 (2015).
298. See Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine
Age: The Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 505–06.
299. See Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 300–13 (2014).
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minimum, the capital requirements applicable to banks should apply to nonbanks as well. As former Vice Chairman Fischer has suggested, they should
be required to “maintain buffers of highly liquid assets that are sized
according to the risk that their liabilities will run off quickly in a stress[ful]
situation.”300
On the substantive side of the transactions, the use of untested and
unconventional criteria for assessing creditworthiness should be allowed
only as a comparative measure. The surface appeal of non-debt financing
seems well-calculated to mask the genuine risks not just to the homebuyer,
but to the partner in the alliance or co-venturer. Homebuyers in these
arrangements — particularly, equity sharing arrangements — need the same
kind of cost of finance disclosures as borrowers from banks. To head off
systemic and ripple market effects when the market turns bad, these finance
companies should be required to make the same ATR determination as
lenders. As I suggested in my earlier work, financial ability is not a static,
fixed thing, but ebbs and flows with the economic tides. This means that the
assessment of risk should anticipate that life happens. The best responses to
life changes that make it impossible to meet financial obligations cannot
handily be addressed by moratoria on foreclosures and stimulus checks.301
Instead, we need to build in mechanisms for systemic or market adjustments
— ones that perhaps index payments to the events in the economy, indeed to
personal circumstances.
The merits of NDNBs, novel creatures in many respects, must be
evaluated for their hidden and obvious threats before they take root that is
too deep to pull up. As their place in the taxonomy of common law property
is not clearly established, the contours of rights and obligations may need
legislative definition. The result may be something sui generis in terms of
category, but with bright lines fixed that delineate contours. NDNBs must
not be allowed to operate on the edges, but must be brought squarely within
the established, tested regime and held up against safety and soundness
measures calibrated to the risk inherent in financing home purchases in the
shadows.

300. Fischer, supra note 121, at 7.
301. The HUD Single-Family Housing Policy Handbook includes “residual income”

as a compensating factor in calculating the allowable DTI ratio. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING
& URB. DEV., HANDBOOK 4000.1, FHA SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY HANDBOOK
339–43 (2021).

